Laurel Technologies Partnership awarded $19.25M for UK Strike Group NRE, with a 365-day duration

Contract Overview

Contract Amount: $19,254,494 ($19.3M)

Contractor: Laurel Technologies Partnership

Awarding Agency: Department of Defense

Start Date: 2018-09-28

End Date: 2019-09-28

Contract Duration: 365 days

Daily Burn Rate: $52.8K/day

Competition Type: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

Pricing Type: COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE

Sector: Defense

Official Description: UK STRIKE GROUP NRE

Place of Performance

Location: JOHNSTOWN, CAMBRIA County, PENNSYLVANIA, 15904

State: Pennsylvania Government Spending

Plain-Language Summary

Department of Defense obligated $19.3 million to LAUREL TECHNOLOGIES PARTNERSHIP for work described as: UK STRIKE GROUP NRE Key points: 1. The contract value of $19.25M appears reasonable for specialized NRE services, though direct comparisons are limited. 2. Full and open competition was utilized, suggesting a potentially competitive pricing environment. 3. The contract type (Cost Plus Incentive Fee) introduces performance-based incentives but also carries inherent cost-reimbursement risks. 4. The duration of 365 days is standard for NRE projects of this nature. 5. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 334419 indicates a focus on 'Other Electronic Component Manufacturing'. 6. The contract was awarded by the Department of the Navy, indicating a defense-related application.

Value Assessment

Rating: fair

Benchmarking the value of this contract is challenging due to the specialized nature of 'UK STRIKE GROUP NRE' and the lack of publicly available comparable contract data. The Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract type means the final cost could fluctuate based on performance against targets. Without specific performance metrics or detailed cost breakdowns, a definitive value-for-money assessment is difficult. However, the award amount of approximately $19.25 million for a year-long NRE project in the defense sector is not inherently excessive, but requires closer scrutiny of the contractor's cost proposals and achieved efficiencies.

Cost Per Unit: N/A

Competition Analysis

Competition Level: full-and-open

The contract was awarded under 'FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION', indicating that all responsible sources were permitted to submit offers. This suggests a robust competitive process was intended. However, the specific number of bidders and the details of the bidding process are not provided in the data. A full and open competition generally promotes price discovery and allows the government to select the best value offer, which could include a combination of technical merit and cost.

Taxpayer Impact: A full and open competition is favorable for taxpayers as it increases the likelihood of obtaining competitive pricing and prevents potential price inflation associated with limited or sole-source procurements.

Public Impact

The primary beneficiaries are likely the Department of the Navy and potentially allied naval forces utilizing the UK Strike Group. The services delivered are 'NRE' (Non-Recurring Engineering), which typically involves design, development, and testing of new systems or components. The geographic impact is primarily within the United States, given the contractor's location in Pennsylvania, but the ultimate use is defense-related, potentially with international implications. Workforce implications include employment for engineers, technicians, and support staff at Laurel Technologies Partnership and potentially its subcontractors.

Waste & Efficiency Indicators

Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10

Warning Flags

Cost Plus Incentive Fee contracts can lead to cost overruns if performance targets are not met or if the incentive structure is not well-aligned with project goals.
The specialized nature of NRE work makes it difficult to establish precise cost benchmarks, potentially leading to less predictable spending.
Lack of detailed performance data makes it hard to assess if the contractor is achieving optimal efficiency and value.
The specific 'UK STRIKE GROUP NRE' is not clearly defined, making it difficult to assess the scope and potential risks associated with the project.

Positive Signals

Awarded under full and open competition, suggesting a competitive environment that should drive better pricing.
The contractor, Laurel Technologies Partnership, is based in Pennsylvania, potentially supporting domestic manufacturing and employment.
The contract has a defined duration of 365 days, providing a clear timeframe for project completion.
The use of an incentive fee structure, if properly managed, can motivate the contractor to achieve specific performance objectives efficiently.

Sector Analysis

The contract falls under the 'Other Electronic Component Manufacturing' sector (NAICS 334419), which is a specialized area within the broader electronics industry. This sector involves the production of electronic components not elsewhere classified, often requiring advanced manufacturing processes and significant research and development. Spending in this sector is heavily influenced by defense, aerospace, and high-tech consumer electronics demand. Comparable spending benchmarks are difficult to ascertain without more specific details on the 'NRE' components involved, but defense-related NRE contracts can range from millions to hundreds of millions of dollars depending on complexity and scale.

Small Business Impact

The data indicates that small business participation (sb) is false, and there is no indication of a small business set-aside (ss). This suggests the contract was not specifically targeted towards small businesses. Laurel Technologies Partnership is not identified as a small business in the provided data. Therefore, the contract's direct impact on the small business ecosystem is likely minimal, unless the prime contractor engages in significant subcontracting with small businesses, which is not detailed here.

Oversight & Accountability

Oversight for this contract would primarily fall under the Department of the Navy's contracting and program management offices. The Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) structure necessitates close monitoring of the contractor's costs and performance against established targets to ensure accountability and value for money. Transparency is dependent on the level of detail released in contract awards and performance reports. Inspector General jurisdiction would apply in cases of fraud, waste, or abuse, as with most federal contracts.

Related Government Programs

Naval Systems Development
Electronic Warfare Systems
Defense Research and Development
Naval Ship Systems Engineering
Advanced Component Manufacturing

Risk Flags

Cost Plus Incentive Fee contract type carries inherent cost uncertainty.
Specialized NRE work lacks easily comparable benchmarks.
Limited public information on contractor's specific past performance for this type of work.
Definition of 'UK STRIKE GROUP NRE' is not detailed, hindering full scope risk assessment.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is this federal contract paying for?

Department of Defense awarded $19.3 million to LAUREL TECHNOLOGIES PARTNERSHIP. UK STRIKE GROUP NRE

Who is the contractor on this award?

The obligated recipient is LAUREL TECHNOLOGIES PARTNERSHIP.

Which agency awarded this contract?

Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Department of the Navy).

What is the total obligated amount?

The obligated amount is $19.3 million.

What is the period of performance?

Start: 2018-09-28. End: 2019-09-28.

What is the specific nature of the 'UK STRIKE GROUP NRE' and what are the key performance objectives?

The provided data abbreviates the contract's purpose as 'UK STRIKE GROUP NRE' (Non-Recurring Engineering). NRE typically refers to the one-time costs associated with the design, development, testing, and integration of new systems or components. Without further details, it's impossible to specify the exact nature of the 'UK STRIKE GROUP NRE'. It could involve anything from developing new radar components, communication systems, or specialized electronic warfare modules for a naval strike group. Key performance objectives are usually tied to the CPIF contract type, which would involve meeting specific technical milestones, delivery schedules, or performance metrics related to the developed components. These objectives are critical for the contractor to earn incentive fees and for the government to ensure the project's success.

How does the Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) structure impact the final cost and contractor performance?

A Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract is a type of cost-reimbursement contract where the contractor is reimbursed for allowable costs and also receives a fee that is adjusted based on whether the final cost is below or above a pre-negotiated target cost. The incentive is typically tied to performance objectives, such as schedule, technical performance, or cost savings. For taxpayers, a CPIF contract introduces uncertainty in the final cost, as it can exceed the initial estimate if targets are missed or if costs escalate. However, it can also lead to cost savings if the contractor performs exceptionally well and achieves targets efficiently. For contractor performance, the CPIF structure incentivizes the contractor to manage costs effectively and meet or exceed performance goals to maximize their fee. Close government oversight is crucial to ensure the targets are appropriate and that the contractor is genuinely working towards them.

What is Laurel Technologies Partnership's track record with similar defense contracts?

The provided data identifies Laurel Technologies Partnership as the contractor for this specific contract. However, it does not include information about their past performance, track record, or experience with similar defense contracts. To assess their reliability and expertise for 'UK STRIKE GROUP NRE', a review of their contract history, past performance evaluations (e.g., CPARS reports), and any prior experience with the Department of the Navy or similar NRE projects would be necessary. Without this information, it's difficult to gauge their suitability beyond the fact that they were awarded this contract through a competitive process.

Are there any specific risks associated with the 'Other Electronic Component Manufacturing' sector for defense applications?

The 'Other Electronic Component Manufacturing' sector (NAICS 334419) can present several risks, particularly within defense applications. These include supply chain vulnerabilities for specialized materials, rapid technological obsolescence requiring continuous R&D investment, and stringent quality control requirements to ensure reliability in harsh operational environments. For defense, there's also the risk of intellectual property theft or compromise, and the need to comply with complex export control regulations if components are intended for international use. Furthermore, the NRE nature of this contract implies development of novel components, which inherently carries technical risks related to feasibility, performance, and integration into larger systems.

How does this contract's value compare to other NRE contracts within the Department of the Navy?

The contract value of approximately $19.25 million for a 365-day NRE project is within a common range for specialized defense development work. However, direct comparisons are difficult without knowing the specific technical scope and complexity of the 'UK STRIKE GROUP NRE'. The Department of the Navy procures a wide array of NRE services, from software development to hardware prototyping, with values varying significantly. Contracts for major system development can run into hundreds of millions or even billions. This $19.25 million award suggests a focused NRE effort on specific components or subsystems rather than a full system development. Benchmarking would require access to a database of similar NRE contracts, detailing scope, duration, and contractor performance.

What are the potential long-term implications of this NRE investment for the UK Strike Group?

The long-term implications of this Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) investment for the UK Strike Group depend heavily on the success of the development effort. If the NRE leads to the creation of effective, reliable, and technologically advanced components or systems, it could significantly enhance the operational capabilities, efficiency, and survivability of the strike group. This could translate into improved mission effectiveness, reduced maintenance costs over the system's lifecycle, or the ability to counter emerging threats. Conversely, if the NRE project faces significant technical challenges, results in components that are difficult to integrate or maintain, or becomes obsolete quickly, the long-term benefits may be diminished, and the initial investment might not yield the expected return in operational capability.

Industry Classification

NAICS: Manufacturing › Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component Manufacturing › Other Electronic Component Manufacturing

Product/Service Code: SUPPORT SVCS (PROF, ADMIN, MGMT) › PROFESSIONAL SERVICES

Competition & Pricing

Extent Competed: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

Solicitation Procedures: NEGOTIATED PROPOSAL/QUOTE

Solicitation ID: N0025313R0013

Pricing Type: COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE (V)

Evaluated Preference: NONE

Contractor Details

Parent Company: Leonardo SPA

Address: 246 AIRPORT RD, JOHNSTOWN, PA, 15904

Business Categories: Category Business, Manufacturer of Goods, Not Designated a Small Business, Partnership or Limited Liability Partnership, Special Designations, U.S.-Owned Business

Financial Breakdown

Contract Ceiling: $19,287,620

Exercised Options: $19,287,620

Current Obligation: $19,254,494

Subaward Activity

Number of Subawards: 12

Total Subaward Amount: $3,581,112

Contract Characteristics

Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS/SERVICES PROCEDURES NOT USED

Cost or Pricing Data: NO

Parent Contract

Parent Award PIID: N0025314D0004

IDV Type: IDC

Timeline