DoD awards $44.7M Lockheed Martin contract for Poland's Wisla system integration, with no competition

Contract Overview

Contract Amount: $44,725,247 ($44.7M)

Contractor: Lockheed Martin Corporation

Awarding Agency: Department of Defense

Start Date: 2025-05-01

End Date: 2028-04-30

Contract Duration: 1,095 days

Daily Burn Rate: $40.8K/day

Competition Type: NOT COMPETED

Number of Offers Received: 1

Pricing Type: COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE

Sector: Defense

Official Description: POLAND WISLA SYSTEM INTEGRATION AND SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT (WISLA-SISA) FOLLOW ON, INCLUDING FAIR SHARE DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATED BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM (IBCS) FIRE CONTROL (FC) AND LINK-ON-ELES (LOE) SOFTWARE SUPPORT.

Place of Performance

Location: GRAND PRAIRIE, DALLAS County, TEXAS, 75051

State: Texas Government Spending

Plain-Language Summary

Department of Defense obligated $44.7 million to LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION for work described as: POLAND WISLA SYSTEM INTEGRATION AND SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT (WISLA-SISA) FOLLOW ON, INCLUDING FAIR SHARE DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATED BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM (IBCS) FIRE CONTROL (FC) AND LINK-ON-ELES (LOE) SOFTWARE SUPPORT. Key points: 1. Contract focuses on critical software support for integrated battle command systems. 2. Sole-source award raises questions about price discovery and potential cost efficiencies. 3. Long-term contract (3 years) suggests a sustained need for these specialized services. 4. The award is a follow-on, indicating prior work and potential for contractor lock-in. 5. Texas-based contractor highlights geographic concentration of defense industry work. 6. The contract type (Cost Plus Incentive Fee) allows for shared savings but can incentivize cost overruns.

Value Assessment

Rating: questionable

The contract's value of $44.7 million over three years for software support is difficult to benchmark without specific details on the scope of work and deliverables. The Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) structure, while designed to incentivize efficiency, can also lead to higher costs if not managed carefully. The lack of competition means there's no market-based validation of the pricing. Compared to similar sole-source software integration contracts, the pricing could be higher due to the absence of competitive pressure.

Cost Per Unit: N/A

Competition Analysis

Competition Level: sole-source

This contract was awarded on a sole-source basis, meaning only one contractor, Lockheed Martin Corporation, was solicited. This approach is typically used when only one source is capable of meeting the requirement, often due to proprietary technology or unique expertise. The lack of competition limits the government's ability to explore alternative solutions or negotiate the most favorable pricing through a bidding process.

Taxpayer Impact: Taxpayers may not be receiving the best possible value due to the absence of competitive bidding, potentially leading to higher costs than if multiple vendors had competed.

Public Impact

The primary beneficiaries are the U.S. Department of Defense and the Polish military, enhancing interoperability and command capabilities. Services delivered include software support for the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) fire control and link-on-elements. The contract has a geographic impact primarily in Texas, where the contractor is based, potentially supporting local jobs. Workforce implications include the need for specialized software engineers and technical personnel within Lockheed Martin.

Waste & Efficiency Indicators

Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10

Warning Flags

  • Sole-source award limits competitive pressure, potentially increasing costs.
  • Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract type can incentivize cost growth if not closely monitored.
  • Follow-on nature of the contract may indicate limited market research for alternative solutions.
  • Lack of transparency in pricing due to sole-source procurement.
  • Potential for contractor lock-in given the specialized nature of the software.

Positive Signals

  • Contract addresses critical national defense needs for a key NATO ally.
  • Follow-on nature suggests successful prior performance and established working relationship.
  • CPIF contract structure aims to align contractor and government interests for cost efficiency.
  • Specialized nature of the work likely requires unique expertise held by Lockheed Martin.
  • Long-term contract provides stability for essential software support.

Sector Analysis

This contract falls within the "Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services" sector, specifically related to defense systems integration and software development. The market for defense command and control systems is highly specialized, often dominated by a few large prime contractors like Lockheed Martin. Spending in this area is driven by modernization efforts, international partnerships (like with Poland), and the need for advanced technological capabilities in defense. Comparable spending benchmarks are difficult to establish due to the unique nature of integrated battle command systems.

Small Business Impact

This contract does not appear to involve a small business set-aside, as indicated by the prime contractor being Lockheed Martin Corporation. There is no explicit mention of subcontracting goals for small businesses within the provided data. The focus on specialized software for advanced defense systems suggests that prime contracting opportunities for small businesses in this specific area may be limited, though they could potentially participate as subcontractors if opportunities arise.

Oversight & Accountability

Oversight for this contract will primarily reside with the Department of the Army contracting officers and program managers. The Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) structure requires diligent monitoring of costs and performance to ensure the incentive goals are met and that the overall cost remains reasonable. Transparency may be limited due to the sole-source nature, but contract performance reviews and financial audits would be standard oversight mechanisms. Inspector General jurisdiction would apply in cases of fraud, waste, or abuse.

Related Government Programs

  • Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS)
  • Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
  • Missile Defense Systems
  • Command and Control Systems
  • Software Development Services

Risk Flags

  • Sole-source procurement
  • Cost-plus contract type
  • Follow-on contract without re-competition
  • Lack of publicly available cost breakdown

Tags

defense, department-of-defense, department-of-the-army, lockheed-martin-corporation, poland, wisla-program, ibcs, software-support, sole-source, cost-plus-incentive-fee, professional-scientific-and-technical-services, texas

Frequently Asked Questions

What is this federal contract paying for?

Department of Defense awarded $44.7 million to LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION. POLAND WISLA SYSTEM INTEGRATION AND SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT (WISLA-SISA) FOLLOW ON, INCLUDING FAIR SHARE DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATED BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM (IBCS) FIRE CONTROL (FC) AND LINK-ON-ELES (LOE) SOFTWARE SUPPORT.

Who is the contractor on this award?

The obligated recipient is LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION.

Which agency awarded this contract?

Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Department of the Army).

What is the total obligated amount?

The obligated amount is $44.7 million.

What is the period of performance?

Start: 2025-05-01. End: 2028-04-30.

What is the specific scope of "Fair Share Development" for the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) Fire Control (FC) and Link-On-Eles (LOE) software support?

The "Fair Share Development" aspect of this contract likely refers to Lockheed Martin's responsibility in contributing to the ongoing evolution and enhancement of the IBCS software, specifically for the Polish Wisla program. This could involve developing new functionalities, integrating upgrades, or ensuring the software meets specific performance requirements tailored to Poland's operational needs. The term suggests a collaborative effort where Lockheed Martin is expected to provide a defined portion of the development resources or expertise necessary to mature the IBCS capabilities for this key ally. Without further details, it's difficult to quantify the exact 'share' or the specific development tasks involved, but it implies a commitment beyond basic maintenance and support towards active system improvement.

How does the Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) structure compare to other contract types for similar defense software development and integration services?

Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contracts are common in defense acquisition, particularly for complex projects where the final cost is uncertain. Unlike fixed-price contracts, CPIF reimburses the contractor for allowable costs plus a fee that is adjusted based on performance against pre-determined targets (e.g., cost, schedule, or technical performance). Compared to Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF), CPIF offers a stronger incentive for the contractor to control costs, as the fee can increase if targets are exceeded but decrease if they are missed. However, compared to firm-fixed-price contracts, CPIF still carries higher cost risk for the government, as the final price is not definitively known at the outset. For specialized software like IBCS, where requirements can evolve and technical challenges are significant, CPIF is often chosen to balance flexibility with cost control, though it requires robust government oversight to manage effectively.

What are the potential risks associated with a sole-source, follow-on contract for critical defense software?

A sole-source, follow-on contract for critical defense software presents several risks. Firstly, the lack of competition can lead to inflated pricing, as the government does not benefit from market-driven cost reductions. Secondly, it can foster contractor complacency, potentially reducing innovation or responsiveness, as the incumbent has a guaranteed position. Thirdly, there's a risk of 'vendor lock-in,' where the government becomes heavily reliant on a single provider's proprietary technology and expertise, making future transitions difficult and costly. Lastly, without competitive pressure, the quality or timeliness of deliverables might be compromised if oversight is insufficient. For critical systems like IBCS, these risks could impact operational readiness and interoperability.

What is Lockheed Martin's track record with the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) and similar international defense integration projects?

Lockheed Martin Corporation is the prime contractor for the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), a cornerstone program for modernizing air and missile defense capabilities. They have a long history of developing and integrating complex defense systems for both the U.S. military and international partners. Their experience with IBCS includes significant development, testing, and fielding efforts, often in collaboration with the U.S. Army and Northrop Grumman (the system's developer). The company has a substantial portfolio of international defense sales and integration projects, including significant work within NATO, such as the Patriot missile defense system, which IBCS aims to enhance and integrate with. This specific follow-on contract for Poland leverages their established expertise and existing relationship with the program.

How does this contract align with broader U.S. defense cooperation goals with Poland and NATO?

This contract directly aligns with broader U.S. defense cooperation goals with Poland and NATO. Poland is a key strategic partner on NATO's eastern flank, and strengthening its defense capabilities is a priority for U.S. foreign policy and collective security. The Wisla program, which includes the IBCS, is a significant component of Poland's modernization efforts and enhances its ability to defend against advanced threats. By providing critical software support and integration services, the U.S. is enabling Poland to effectively operate and potentially interoperate its advanced defense systems with NATO assets. This strengthens overall alliance readiness and interoperability, contributing to regional stability and deterrence.

What are the implications of the contract's duration (3 years) and estimated value ($44.7M) for future spending on the Wisla program?

The three-year duration and $44.7 million value of this contract suggest a sustained, albeit moderate, level of investment in the ongoing support and development of the Wisla system's command and control software. This follow-on award indicates that the initial phases of integration and deployment were successful enough to warrant continued work. The value implies that while significant, it represents a portion of the overall Wisla program costs, which are likely much larger when considering hardware, training, and other services. This contract's duration provides a predictable baseline for this specific software support element, but future spending will depend on the evolving threat landscape, Poland's strategic decisions, and the continued development roadmap for IBCS and related systems.

Industry Classification

NAICS: Professional, Scientific, and Technical ServicesOther Professional, Scientific, and Technical ServicesAll Other Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services

Product/Service Code: MAINT, REPAIR, REBUILD EQUIPMENTMAINT, REPAIR, REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT

Competition & Pricing

Extent Competed: NOT COMPETED

Solicitation Procedures: ONLY ONE SOURCE

Offers Received: 1

Pricing Type: COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE (V)

Evaluated Preference: NONE

Contractor Details

Parent Company: Lockheed Martin Corp

Address: 1701 W MARSHALL DR, GRAND PRAIRIE, TX, 75051

Business Categories: Category Business, Corporate Entity Not Tax Exempt, Manufacturer of Goods, Not Designated a Small Business, Special Designations, U.S.-Owned Business

Financial Breakdown

Contract Ceiling: $52,039,561

Exercised Options: $44,725,247

Current Obligation: $44,725,247

Contract Characteristics

Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS/SERVICES PROCEDURES NOT USED

Parent Contract

Parent Award PIID: W31P4Q22G0003

IDV Type: BOA

Timeline

Start Date: 2025-05-01

Current End Date: 2028-04-30

Potential End Date: 2028-04-30 00:00:00

Last Modified: 2025-11-12

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