DoD's $41.6M B-2 Logistics Contract Awarded to Northrop Grumman Without Competition
Contract Overview
Contract Amount: $41,583,050 ($41.6M)
Contractor: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp
Awarding Agency: Department of Defense
Start Date: 2012-01-01
End Date: 2014-12-31
Contract Duration: 1,095 days
Daily Burn Rate: $38.0K/day
Competition Type: NOT COMPETED
Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE
Sector: Defense
Official Description: CY12 B-2 PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS (PBL) CONTRACTOR INVENTORY CONTROL POINT (CICP) SUSTAINMENT
Place of Performance
Location: PALMDALE, LOS ANGELES County, CALIFORNIA, 93550
Plain-Language Summary
Department of Defense obligated $41.6 million to NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORP for work described as: CY12 B-2 PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS (PBL) CONTRACTOR INVENTORY CONTROL POINT (CICP) SUSTAINMENT Key points: 1. Contract awarded on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, indicating potential for cost overruns. 2. Sole-source award raises concerns about price discovery and potential lack of competitive pressure. 3. Performance-based logistics (PBL) aims for improved readiness and reduced costs through contractor incentives. 4. Contract duration of 1095 days (3 years) suggests a long-term commitment to sustainment. 5. The contract falls under Aircraft Manufacturing (NAICS 336411), a specialized and high-value sector. 6. No small business set-aside or subcontracting was indicated, potentially limiting small business participation.
Value Assessment
Rating: questionable
The contract's cost-plus-fixed-fee structure, combined with a sole-source award, makes a direct value-for-money assessment challenging without further data on cost drivers and profit margins. Benchmarking against similar PBL contracts for other high-value platforms would be necessary to determine if the pricing is competitive. The absence of competition suggests that the government may not have achieved the most favorable pricing.
Cost Per Unit: N/A
Competition Analysis
Competition Level: sole-source
This contract was awarded on a sole-source basis, meaning Northrop Grumman was the only bidder. This approach is typically used when a unique capability or proprietary technology is required, or when there is insufficient time to conduct a full and open competition. The lack of multiple bidders means there was no competitive pressure to drive down prices or encourage innovative solutions.
Taxpayer Impact: Taxpayers may have paid a premium due to the absence of competition. Without a competitive bidding process, there is a risk that the contract price is higher than it would have been in a more open market.
Public Impact
The primary beneficiaries are the U.S. Air Force and the B-2 bomber fleet, ensuring operational readiness. Services delivered include contractor inventory control point sustainment, crucial for maintaining the B-2's complex systems. The geographic impact is primarily within the United States, supporting critical defense infrastructure. Workforce implications include specialized technical roles within Northrop Grumman and potentially at DoD maintenance facilities.
Waste & Efficiency Indicators
Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10
Warning Flags
- Sole-source award limits competitive pricing and potential innovation.
- Cost-plus-fixed-fee structure can incentivize cost overruns if not managed tightly.
- Lack of small business participation may not fully leverage the broader industrial base.
Positive Signals
- Performance-based logistics (PBL) can drive efficiency and improve system availability.
- Contractor has existing expertise with the B-2 platform, potentially ensuring continuity.
- Sustaining a critical asset like the B-2 is vital for national security.
Sector Analysis
This contract operates within the aerospace and defense sector, specifically focusing on sustainment and logistics for a high-value, complex military aircraft. The market for such specialized services is often concentrated among a few prime contractors with the requisite expertise and security clearances. Spending benchmarks for aircraft sustainment can vary widely based on platform age, complexity, and operational tempo, but typically represent a significant portion of an aircraft's total lifecycle cost.
Small Business Impact
The contract details indicate no small business set-aside (ss=false) and no indication of subcontracting goals (sb=false). This suggests that the prime contract was not specifically targeted towards small businesses, and there is no explicit requirement for the prime contractor to engage small businesses for subcontracting opportunities. This could limit the participation of small businesses in this specific contract, although they may be involved further down the supply chain.
Oversight & Accountability
Oversight for this contract would typically fall under the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), which is responsible for ensuring contractor performance and compliance. The contract type (Cost Plus Fixed Fee) necessitates close monitoring of costs and adherence to the fixed fee. Transparency is generally maintained through contract reporting requirements, but specific oversight mechanisms and inspector general jurisdiction would depend on the detailed terms of the contract and any associated task orders.
Related Government Programs
- B-2 Bomber Sustainment Programs
- Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Contracts
- Aerospace Contractor Support Services
- Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) Contracts
Risk Flags
- Sole-source award
- Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract type
- Lack of small business subcontracting requirements
Tags
defense, department-of-defense, northrop-grumman-systems-corp, sole-source, cost-plus-fixed-fee, performance-based-logistics, aircraft-manufacturing, sustainment, california, cy12, delivery-order
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this federal contract paying for?
Department of Defense awarded $41.6 million to NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORP. CY12 B-2 PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS (PBL) CONTRACTOR INVENTORY CONTROL POINT (CICP) SUSTAINMENT
Who is the contractor on this award?
The obligated recipient is NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORP.
Which agency awarded this contract?
Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Defense Contract Management Agency).
What is the total obligated amount?
The obligated amount is $41.6 million.
What is the period of performance?
Start: 2012-01-01. End: 2014-12-31.
What is the historical spending trend for B-2 Performance Based Logistics (PBL) Contractor Inventory Control Point (CICP) Sustainment contracts with Northrop Grumman?
Analyzing historical spending for this specific contract requires access to detailed contract databases that track awards over multiple fiscal years. However, generally, sustainment costs for major defense platforms like the B-2 are substantial and can fluctuate based on operational tempo, modernization efforts, and the availability of spare parts. Performance-based logistics contracts aim to stabilize these costs by incentivizing the contractor to meet specific performance metrics. Without specific historical data for this CICP sustainment contract, it's difficult to establish a precise trend, but it's reasonable to assume that sustainment costs for such a critical and aging platform would be significant and ongoing throughout its operational life.
How does the pricing structure (Cost Plus Fixed Fee) of this contract compare to industry benchmarks for similar sustainment services?
Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contracts are common in complex, long-term sustainment efforts where the scope of work may evolve. The 'cost plus' component means the government reimburses the contractor for allowable costs, while the 'fixed fee' represents the contractor's profit, which is fixed regardless of the final cost. Benchmarking CPFF contracts is challenging as profit margins can vary based on risk, complexity, and negotiation. However, industry best practices suggest that CPFF contracts should be used judiciously and require robust oversight to prevent cost overruns. For sustainment, a higher proportion of fixed-price or performance-based elements is often preferred to incentivize efficiency. The fixed fee in this contract would need to be assessed against typical profit rates for similar defense sustainment services, which can range from 7-15% depending on factors like contract type and risk.
What are the specific performance metrics and incentives included in this Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) contract?
The provided data does not detail the specific performance metrics or incentives within this PBL contract. Performance-Based Logistics contracts are designed around measurable outcomes, such as aircraft availability rates, response times for parts delivery, or system uptime. Incentives are typically structured to reward the contractor for exceeding these metrics and disincentivize underperformance. To understand the effectiveness of this PBL contract, a review of the contract's Statement of Objectives (SOO) or Performance Work Statement (PWS) would be necessary to identify the key performance parameters (KPPs) and the associated incentive/disincentive clauses.
What is Northrop Grumman's track record in managing similar sustainment contracts for high-value military assets?
Northrop Grumman has a significant track record in managing complex sustainment and logistics programs for major defense platforms, including the B-2 Spirit bomber itself. Their experience encompasses integrated logistics support, supply chain management, maintenance, and repair services. While specific performance details for individual contracts are often proprietary or require deeper analysis, the company's long-standing role as a prime contractor for the B-2 program suggests a substantial level of established capability and institutional knowledge. Evaluating their performance on this specific contract would involve reviewing past performance evaluations, any contract disputes, and their ability to meet key performance indicators on similar PBL contracts.
What are the potential risks associated with a sole-source award for critical sustainment services like this?
A sole-source award for critical sustainment services carries several potential risks. Firstly, the absence of competition can lead to higher prices than might be achieved through a competitive bidding process, as the contractor faces less pressure to optimize costs. Secondly, it can reduce the incentive for innovation, as the contractor may not feel compelled to develop more efficient or cost-effective solutions. Thirdly, it can create vendor lock-in, making it difficult and costly to switch providers in the future. Finally, without competitive benchmarking, it can be harder for the government to ensure it is receiving the best possible value for its investment. Robust contract management and oversight are crucial to mitigate these risks.
Industry Classification
NAICS: Manufacturing › Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing › Aircraft Manufacturing
Product/Service Code: SUPPORT SVCS (PROF, ADMIN, MGMT) › PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
Competition & Pricing
Extent Competed: NOT COMPETED
Solicitation Procedures: ONLY ONE SOURCE
Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE (U)
Evaluated Preference: NONE
Contractor Details
Parent Company: Northrop Grumman Corporation (UEI: 967356127)
Address: 3520 E AVE M, PALMDALE, CA, 93550
Business Categories: Category Business, Corporate Entity Not Tax Exempt, Not Designated a Small Business, Special Designations, U.S.-Owned Business
Financial Breakdown
Contract Ceiling: $41,583,050
Exercised Options: $41,583,050
Current Obligation: $41,583,050
Subaward Activity
Number of Subawards: 3
Total Subaward Amount: $208,449
Contract Characteristics
Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL ITEM PROCEDURES NOT USED
Cost or Pricing Data: YES
Parent Contract
Parent Award PIID: F3365799D0028
IDV Type: IDC
Timeline
Start Date: 2012-01-01
Current End Date: 2014-12-31
Potential End Date: 2014-12-31 00:00:00
Last Modified: 2019-02-01
More Contracts from Northrop Grumman Systems Corp
- Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (gbsd) Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) and Early Production and Deployment (P&D) — $11.7B (Department of Defense)
- Acat 1D B-2 Dms-M EMD — $863.7M (Department of Defense)
- 200411!000088!5700!GU22 !asc/Ysk !F3365799D0028 !A!N! !N!0023 ! !20040827!20081230!362686958!008255408!016435559!n!northrop Grumman Systems Corpo!3520 East Avenue M !palmdale !ca!93550!55156!037!06!palmdale !LOS Angeles !california!+000000400000!n!n!000000000000!ac65!rdte/Electronics&communication Eq-Eng/Manuf DEV !a1c!other Aircraft Equipment !376 !B-2 RMP !336411!E! !5!B!S! ! ! !99990909!B! ! !n!z!d!n!r!1!001!n!1a!z!y!z! ! !N!C!N! ! ! !a!a!a!a!000!a!d!n! ! ! !Y! ! !0001! ! — $542.1M (Department of Defense)
- Acat 1, B2 UCA for DMS TD Phase 2 — $536.3M (Department of Defense)
- Enhanced Polar System Recapitalization - TWO Payloads (P6&P7) — $472.1M (Department of Defense)
Other Department of Defense Contracts
- Federal Contract — $51.3B (Humana Government Business Inc)
- Lrip LOT 12 Advance Acquisition Contract — $35.1B (Lockheed Martin Corporation)
- SSN 802 and 803 Long Lead Time Material — $34.7B (Electric Boat Corporation)
- 200204!008532!1700!AF600 !naval AIR Systems Command !N0001902C3002 !A!N! !N! !20011026!20120430!008016958!008016958!834951691!n!lockheed Martin Corporation !lockheed Blvd !fort Worth !tx!76108!27000!439!48!fort Worth !tarrant !texas !+000026000000!n!n!018981928201!ac15!rdte/Aircraft-Eng/Manuf Develop !a1a!airframes and Spares !2ama!jast/Jsf !336411!E! !3! ! ! ! ! !99990909!B! ! !A! !a!n!r!2!002!n!1a!a!n!z! ! !N!C!N! ! ! !a!a!a!a!000!a!c!n! ! ! !Y! !N00019!0001! — $34.2B (Lockheed Martin Corporation)
- KC-X Modernization Program — $32.0B (THE Boeing Company)