DoD awards $18.3M engineering services contract to Scientific Research Corporation for 2 years

Contract Overview

Contract Amount: $18,307,194 ($18.3M)

Contractor: Scientific Research Corporation

Awarding Agency: Department of Defense

Start Date: 2019-09-12

End Date: 2025-01-10

Contract Duration: 1,947 days

Daily Burn Rate: $9.4K/day

Competition Type: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

Number of Offers Received: 3

Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE

Sector: Defense

Official Description: THIS IS A COST PLUS FIXED FEE (CPFF) LEVEL OF EFFORT (LOE) TERM TASK ORDER (TO) AWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH (IAW) THE PROPOSAL (REFERENCE: PROPOSAL NO. 19.2007) RECEIVED FROM SRC DATED 17 JUNE 2019.

Place of Performance

Location: NORTH CHARLESTON, CHARLESTON County, SOUTH CAROLINA, 29419

State: South Carolina Government Spending

Plain-Language Summary

Department of Defense obligated $18.3 million to SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CORPORATION for work described as: THIS IS A COST PLUS FIXED FEE (CPFF) LEVEL OF EFFORT (LOE) TERM TASK ORDER (TO) AWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH (IAW) THE PROPOSAL (REFERENCE: PROPOSAL NO. 19.2007) RECEIVED FROM SRC DATED 17 JUNE 2019. Key points: 1. Contract awarded via full and open competition, suggesting a competitive bidding process. 2. Cost-plus fixed fee structure may incentivize contractor to manage costs effectively. 3. Task order is for engineering services, a critical component of defense operations. 4. Contract duration of nearly two years indicates a significant, ongoing need. 5. The contract is a delivery order, suggesting it's part of a larger indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract. 6. The contractor, Scientific Research Corporation, has a track record in providing engineering services.

Value Assessment

Rating: good

The contract value of $18.3 million over approximately two years for engineering services appears reasonable given the scope. Benchmarking against similar engineering services contracts within the Department of Defense is necessary for a definitive value assessment. The cost-plus fixed fee (CPFF) structure, while common, requires careful monitoring to ensure cost efficiencies are realized by the contractor.

Cost Per Unit: N/A

Competition Analysis

Competition Level: full-and-open

This contract was awarded under full and open competition, indicating that multiple bidders were likely considered. The presence of multiple bidders generally fosters price discovery and can lead to more competitive pricing for the government. The specific number of proposals received is not detailed, but the award method suggests a robust competitive environment.

Taxpayer Impact: Full and open competition is beneficial for taxpayers as it increases the likelihood of obtaining services at a fair market price, preventing potential overspending associated with less competitive solicitations.

Public Impact

The Department of the Navy benefits from specialized engineering services to support its operations. This contract likely supports critical defense infrastructure and technological advancements. The geographic impact is primarily within the operational areas of the Department of the Navy, potentially worldwide. Workforce implications may include the employment of engineers and technical specialists by the contractor.

Waste & Efficiency Indicators

Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10

Warning Flags

Cost-plus contracts can sometimes lead to cost overruns if not managed diligently.
The fixed fee component needs to be adequately justified to ensure it reflects the effort required.

Positive Signals

Awarded under full and open competition, suggesting competitive pricing.
Engineering services are crucial for defense readiness and technological development.
The contractor has a history of providing similar services.

Sector Analysis

Engineering services are a vital sector within the defense industry, encompassing a wide range of activities from design and development to testing and maintenance of military systems and infrastructure. The market for defense engineering services is substantial, driven by the continuous need for technological modernization and operational support. This contract fits within the broader category of professional services supporting national security objectives.

Small Business Impact

The provided data indicates that this contract was not set aside for small businesses (ss: false, sb: false). Therefore, there are no direct subcontracting implications for small businesses stemming from a set-aside provision. The primary contractor, Scientific Research Corporation, will likely manage its own subcontracting needs, if any, as part of its overall project execution.

Oversight & Accountability

Oversight for this contract would typically be managed by the contracting officer and the contract administration team within the Department of the Navy. Performance monitoring, financial reviews, and adherence to contract terms are standard oversight mechanisms. Transparency is generally maintained through contract databases and reporting requirements, though specific details of ongoing oversight are not provided.

Related Government Programs

Department of Defense Engineering Services
Naval Sea Systems Command Contracts
Cost-Plus Fixed Fee Contracts
Engineering and Technical Services

Risk Flags

Cost-plus contract structure requires vigilant oversight to manage costs.
Performance metrics and quality assurance details are not publicly specified.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is this federal contract paying for?

Department of Defense awarded $18.3 million to SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CORPORATION. THIS IS A COST PLUS FIXED FEE (CPFF) LEVEL OF EFFORT (LOE) TERM TASK ORDER (TO) AWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH (IAW) THE PROPOSAL (REFERENCE: PROPOSAL NO. 19.2007) RECEIVED FROM SRC DATED 17 JUNE 2019.

Who is the contractor on this award?

The obligated recipient is SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CORPORATION.

Which agency awarded this contract?

Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Department of the Navy).

What is the total obligated amount?

The obligated amount is $18.3 million.

What is the period of performance?

Start: 2019-09-12. End: 2025-01-10.

What is the track record of Scientific Research Corporation in delivering engineering services for the Department of Defense?

Scientific Research Corporation (SRC) has a history of providing engineering and technical services to various government agencies, including the Department of Defense. Their experience often spans areas such as systems engineering, software development, and integration for complex defense platforms. While specific performance metrics for this particular task order are not publicly detailed, SRC's general engagement in defense contracts suggests a capacity to meet the requirements. Further analysis would involve reviewing past performance evaluations and any reported issues on previous DoD contracts to fully assess their track record.

How does the $18.3 million contract value compare to similar engineering services contracts awarded by the Navy?

The $18.3 million contract value for approximately two years of engineering services is within a common range for specialized technical support within the Department of the Navy. However, a precise comparison requires benchmarking against contracts with similar scopes of work, technical requirements, and duration. Factors such as the specific engineering disciplines required (e.g., naval architecture, electronics, systems integration) and the complexity of the systems involved significantly influence pricing. Without detailed comparative data on similar task orders, it's challenging to definitively state if this represents exceptional value, but it does not appear to be an outlier for substantial engineering support.

What are the primary risks associated with a Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract structure for this type of service?

The primary risk with a Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract is that the contractor may have less incentive to control costs compared to fixed-price contracts, as costs are reimbursed. However, the 'fixed fee' component provides a defined profit margin, which can incentivize efficient performance. For the government, the risk lies in potential cost overruns if the contractor's estimated costs are inaccurate or if unforeseen issues arise that significantly increase the actual costs. Diligent oversight, detailed cost tracking, and clear definition of the scope of work are crucial to mitigate these risks and ensure value for money.

What is the expected effectiveness of the engineering services provided under this contract for the Department of the Navy?

The effectiveness of the engineering services under this contract is expected to be high, given the critical nature of engineering support for naval operations and systems. These services likely contribute to the design, development, maintenance, or modernization of naval assets, directly impacting operational readiness and technological superiority. The specific effectiveness will depend on the quality of the engineering solutions provided by Scientific Research Corporation, their ability to meet technical specifications, and how well these services integrate with broader naval programs. The long-term impact relates to the reliability and performance of the systems supported.

What are the historical spending patterns for engineering services by the Department of the Navy in recent years?

Historical spending patterns for engineering services by the Department of the Navy have consistently been in the billions of dollars annually. The Navy procures a vast array of engineering support, encompassing everything from ship design and maintenance to advanced weapons systems development and cybersecurity. Spending fluctuates based on modernization programs, fleet readiness needs, and specific technological advancements. This $18.3 million task order represents a small fraction of the Navy's overall annual expenditure on engineering and technical services, reflecting a continuous and significant investment in this domain.

How does the competition level (full and open) influence the pricing and quality of engineering services obtained?

A 'full and open' competition typically leads to more competitive pricing because multiple offerors are encouraged to submit proposals, driving down costs as they vie for the contract. This process also tends to enhance the quality of services, as contractors are motivated to present their best technical solutions and capabilities to win the award. The government benefits from a wider range of options and potentially superior technical approaches. The specific number of bidders and the evaluation criteria are key determinants of how effectively competition translates into optimal price and quality outcomes.

Industry Classification

NAICS: Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services › Architectural, Engineering, and Related Services › Engineering Services

Product/Service Code: SUPPORT SVCS (PROF, ADMIN, MGMT) › PROFESSIONAL SERVICES

Competition & Pricing

Extent Competed: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

Solicitation Procedures: SUBJECT TO MULTIPLE AWARD FAIR OPPORTUNITY

Solicitation ID: N6523619R3514

Offers Received: 3

Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE (U)

Evaluated Preference: NONE

Contractor Details

Address: 2300 WINDY RIDGE PKWY, ATLANTA, GA, 30339

Business Categories: Category Business, Corporate Entity Not Tax Exempt, Manufacturer of Goods, Not Designated a Small Business, Special Designations, Subchapter S Corporation, U.S.-Owned Business

Financial Breakdown

Contract Ceiling: $20,417,695

Exercised Options: $20,417,695

Current Obligation: $18,307,194

Actual Outlays: $848,555

Subaward Activity

Number of Subawards: 19

Total Subaward Amount: $2,148,757

Contract Characteristics

Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS/SERVICES PROCEDURES NOT USED

Cost or Pricing Data: NO

Parent Contract

Parent Award PIID: N0017819D8474

IDV Type: IDC

Timeline