DoD awards $45.9M for Cyber Mission Engineering, with Scientific Research Corporation as prime
Contract Overview
Contract Amount: $45,899,248 ($45.9M)
Contractor: Scientific Research Corporation
Awarding Agency: Department of Defense
Start Date: 2019-09-23
End Date: 2025-09-22
Contract Duration: 2,191 days
Daily Burn Rate: $20.9K/day
Competition Type: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION
Number of Offers Received: 5
Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE
Sector: IT
Official Description: CYBER MISSION ENGINEERING TASK ORDER
Place of Performance
Location: ATLANTA, COBB County, GEORGIA, 30339
State: Georgia Government Spending
Plain-Language Summary
Department of Defense obligated $45.9 million to SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CORPORATION for work described as: CYBER MISSION ENGINEERING TASK ORDER Key points: 1. Contract value represents a significant investment in cyber defense capabilities. 2. Competition dynamics suggest a potentially competitive bidding process for this engineering service. 3. Risk indicators include the Cost Plus Fixed Fee pricing structure, which can incentivize cost overruns. 4. Performance context is tied to ongoing cyber mission engineering needs within the Department of the Navy. 5. Sector positioning places this contract within the broader defense IT and engineering services market.
Value Assessment
Rating: fair
The contract's value of $45.9 million over its period of performance needs further benchmarking against similar cyber mission engineering task orders. The Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) pricing structure, while common for research and development or uncertain scope projects, carries inherent risks of cost escalation. Without detailed cost breakdowns or comparisons to industry benchmarks for similar engineering services, assessing the true value-for-money is challenging. The contract's duration and the nature of the services provided will be key factors in determining if the awarded price is competitive.
Cost Per Unit: N/A
Competition Analysis
Competition Level: full-and-open
This contract was awarded under full and open competition, indicating that multiple bidders were likely solicited. The presence of 5 bids suggests a reasonable level of competition, which generally aids in price discovery and can lead to more favorable pricing for the government. However, the specific details of the bidding process, including the number of technically acceptable proposals and the range of pricing submitted, are crucial for a complete understanding of the competitive landscape.
Taxpayer Impact: Full and open competition is generally beneficial for taxpayers as it promotes a wider pool of potential contractors, fostering a more competitive environment that can drive down costs and improve service quality.
Public Impact
The Department of the Navy benefits from enhanced cyber mission engineering capabilities. Services delivered are expected to bolster national cybersecurity defenses. Geographic impact is primarily within the operational areas of the Department of the Navy, with potential for broader national security implications. Workforce implications include employment opportunities for specialized cyber engineers and technical personnel.
Waste & Efficiency Indicators
Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10
Warning Flags
- Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) pricing can lead to cost overruns if not closely managed.
- The broad scope of 'engineering services' may present challenges in defining and controlling project deliverables.
- Reliance on a single task order for a significant portion of cyber mission engineering could concentrate risk.
- Long contract duration (2191 days) increases exposure to evolving cyber threats and technological obsolescence.
Positive Signals
- Awarded under full and open competition, suggesting a robust selection process.
- Multiple bids received (5) indicate market interest and potential for competitive pricing.
- Contractor's experience in engineering services is likely a positive factor in performance.
- Clear performance period (2019-2025) provides a defined timeframe for service delivery.
Sector Analysis
The defense engineering services sector is a critical component of the U.S. federal market, supporting advanced technological development and operational readiness. This contract falls within the broader IT and professional services categories, with a specific focus on cybersecurity engineering. The market is characterized by a mix of large prime contractors and specialized subcontractors. Spending in this area is driven by evolving threats and the need for continuous innovation in defense capabilities. Comparable spending benchmarks would involve analyzing other large engineering services contracts awarded by the Department of Defense and its various branches.
Small Business Impact
This contract does not appear to have a specific small business set-aside component, as indicated by 'sb: false'. The prime contractor, Scientific Research Corporation, is likely responsible for managing subcontracting opportunities. Analysis of subcontracting plans would be necessary to determine the extent to which small businesses will participate in fulfilling the contract requirements. The absence of a direct set-aside means that small businesses would need to compete for subcontracts, which can be challenging depending on the prime's subcontracting strategy and the nature of the work.
Oversight & Accountability
Oversight for this contract would primarily reside with the contracting officer and the relevant program management office within the Department of the Navy. Performance monitoring, deliverable acceptance, and financial oversight are standard mechanisms. Transparency is typically facilitated through contract award databases and reporting requirements. Inspector General jurisdiction would apply in cases of suspected fraud, waste, or abuse related to the contract.
Related Government Programs
- Cybersecurity Services
- Engineering and Technical Services
- Department of Defense IT Modernization
- Naval Warfare Systems Engineering
- Information Technology Professional Services
Risk Flags
- Cost Plus Fixed Fee pricing structure requires careful monitoring to control costs.
- Scope definition for 'engineering services' needs clear management to prevent creep.
- Long contract duration may expose the project to technological obsolescence or changing requirements.
Tags
department-of-defense, department-of-the-navy, engineering-services, cybersecurity, it-services, full-and-open-competition, cost-plus-fixed-fee, task-order, scientific-research-corporation, georgia, professional-services, defense-contracting
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this federal contract paying for?
Department of Defense awarded $45.9 million to SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CORPORATION. CYBER MISSION ENGINEERING TASK ORDER
Who is the contractor on this award?
The obligated recipient is SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CORPORATION.
Which agency awarded this contract?
Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Department of the Navy).
What is the total obligated amount?
The obligated amount is $45.9 million.
What is the period of performance?
Start: 2019-09-23. End: 2025-09-22.
What is the track record of Scientific Research Corporation in delivering complex engineering services for the Department of Defense?
Scientific Research Corporation (SRC) has a history of performing various engineering and technical services for the Department of Defense. Their experience often spans areas such as command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems, electronic warfare, and radar systems. To assess their track record specifically for cyber mission engineering, a deeper dive into their past performance on similar contracts would be necessary. This would involve reviewing past performance evaluations, any reported issues or successes, and the complexity of projects they have managed. Their ability to successfully execute this current task order will depend on their demonstrated expertise in managing scope, schedule, and budget for complex, evolving technical requirements within the defense sector.
How does the Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) pricing structure compare to other contract types for similar cyber mission engineering services?
Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) is a common contract type for research, development, and complex services where the scope is not fully defined at the outset. It allows the contractor to recover all allowable costs plus a predetermined fixed fee representing profit. Compared to Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contracts, CPFF offers more flexibility for the government when requirements are uncertain, but it shifts more cost risk to the government. Other contract types like Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) or Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) introduce performance incentives. For cyber mission engineering, where requirements can rapidly evolve, CPFF might be chosen to ensure necessary work is performed, but it necessitates stringent oversight to control costs and prevent overruns. Benchmarking against FFP or other cost-reimbursement types for similar services would reveal if CPFF was the most appropriate and cost-effective choice.
What are the key performance indicators (KPIs) used to measure the success of this cyber mission engineering task order?
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for a cyber mission engineering task order would typically focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of the engineering services provided. These could include metrics related to the successful development, integration, and testing of cyber capabilities; adherence to project timelines and milestones; the quality and reliability of delivered solutions; and the achievement of specific cyber defense objectives. For instance, KPIs might measure the reduction in system vulnerabilities, the successful implementation of new security protocols, or the timely delivery of engineering documentation and support. The Cost Plus Fixed Fee structure implies that while cost is reimbursed, the 'fixed fee' component might be tied to achieving certain performance targets, making KPIs crucial for both contractor motivation and government oversight.
What is the historical spending trend for cyber mission engineering services within the Department of the Navy?
Analyzing historical spending trends for cyber mission engineering within the Department of the Navy (DoN) is crucial for contextualizing this $45.9 million award. While specific aggregate data for 'cyber mission engineering' as a distinct category might be difficult to isolate without detailed database access, it falls under broader IT, engineering, and professional services spending. The DoN, like all military branches, has seen a significant and generally increasing investment in cybersecurity and related engineering services over the past decade due to the escalating cyber threat landscape. This trend is driven by the need to protect critical naval infrastructure, operational systems, and sensitive data. Understanding the year-over-year growth or fluctuations in this spending area would help determine if this award represents a typical investment, an increase, or a decrease in the DoN's focus on cyber mission engineering.
How does the number of bidders (5) influence the potential for cost savings or innovation in this contract?
A competition with five bidders, as indicated for this contract, generally suggests a healthy level of market interest and a reasonable opportunity for the government to achieve competitive pricing and potentially foster innovation. With multiple firms vying for the contract, there is an incentive for each to offer their best technical solutions and pricing. This level of competition can help prevent price gouging and encourage contractors to propose efficient methods and novel approaches to meet the cyber mission engineering requirements. However, the true impact on cost savings and innovation also depends on the quality of the bids received, the evaluation criteria used, and the specific nature of the engineering services required. A thorough evaluation process is key to leveraging this competition effectively.
Industry Classification
NAICS: Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services › Architectural, Engineering, and Related Services › Engineering Services
Product/Service Code: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT › DEFENSE (OTHER) R&D
Competition & Pricing
Extent Competed: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION
Solicitation Procedures: SUBJECT TO MULTIPLE AWARD FAIR OPPORTUNITY
Offers Received: 5
Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE (U)
Evaluated Preference: NONE
Contractor Details
Address: 2300 WINDY RIDGE PKWY STE 400S, ATLANTA, GA, 30339
Business Categories: Category Business, Corporate Entity Not Tax Exempt, Manufacturer of Goods, Not Designated a Small Business, Special Designations, Subchapter S Corporation, U.S.-Owned Business
Financial Breakdown
Contract Ceiling: $47,709,570
Exercised Options: $47,709,570
Current Obligation: $45,899,248
Actual Outlays: $3,782,986
Subaward Activity
Number of Subawards: 22
Total Subaward Amount: $16,063,870
Contract Characteristics
Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS/SERVICES PROCEDURES NOT USED
Cost or Pricing Data: NO
Parent Contract
Parent Award PIID: N6523619D4809
IDV Type: IDC
Timeline
Start Date: 2019-09-23
Current End Date: 2025-09-22
Potential End Date: 2025-09-22 00:00:00
Last Modified: 2025-08-22
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