DoD's $75.5M Fleet Sustainment Software Contract Awarded to Bell Boeing with Limited Competition

Contract Overview

Contract Amount: $75,484,329 ($75.5M)

Contractor: Bell Boeing Joint Project Office

Awarding Agency: Department of Defense

Start Date: 2017-02-14

End Date: 2024-09-30

Contract Duration: 2,785 days

Daily Burn Rate: $27.1K/day

Competition Type: NOT COMPETED

Number of Offers Received: 1

Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE

Sector: Defense

Official Description: 2019 FLEET SUSTAINMENT SOFTWARE

Place of Performance

Location: AMARILLO, POTTER County, TEXAS, 79111

State: Texas Government Spending

Plain-Language Summary

Department of Defense obligated $75.5 million to BELL BOEING JOINT PROJECT OFFICE for work described as: 2019 FLEET SUSTAINMENT SOFTWARE Key points: 1. The contract's value of over $75 million over its lifespan raises questions about cost-effectiveness given the limited competition. 2. Awarded as a sole-source contract, the lack of open competition may have limited price discovery and potentially inflated costs. 3. The contract's duration of nearly 8 years suggests a long-term need, but the absence of competitive re-evaluation is a risk indicator. 4. Performance context is limited due to the sole-source nature, making it difficult to benchmark against other similar software sustainment solutions. 5. This contract falls within the broader 'Other Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing' sector, but specifically addresses software sustainment. 6. The contract's 'cost plus fixed fee' structure can incentivize cost overruns if not closely monitored. 7. The absence of small business set-asides or subcontracting plans warrants further investigation into potential impacts on the small business ecosystem.

Value Assessment

Rating: questionable

Benchmarking the value of this $75.5 million contract is challenging due to its sole-source nature and the specific 'fleet sustainment software' application. Without comparable contracts or open market pricing, it's difficult to definitively assess if the pricing is competitive or represents good value for money. The 'cost plus fixed fee' pricing structure, while common for complex projects, carries inherent risks of cost escalation if not rigorously managed and audited. The lack of transparency in pricing negotiations due to limited competition makes a direct value-for-money assessment difficult.

Cost Per Unit: N/A

Competition Analysis

Competition Level: sole-source

This contract was awarded on a sole-source basis, meaning only one vendor, Bell Boeing Joint Project Office, was considered. This approach bypasses the standard competitive bidding process, which typically involves multiple vendors submitting proposals. While sole-source awards can be justified for unique capabilities or urgent needs, they significantly reduce the potential for price negotiation and innovation that arises from a competitive environment. The lack of bidders means there was no direct comparison of technical solutions or pricing from alternative providers.

Taxpayer Impact: For taxpayers, a sole-source award means there is a reduced likelihood of achieving the lowest possible price. Without competitive pressure, the awarded price may be higher than what could have been secured through an open competition, potentially leading to a less efficient use of public funds.

Public Impact

The primary beneficiaries are the Department of the Navy, which receives the fleet sustainment software, and Bell Boeing Joint Project Office, the contractor. The services delivered include the sustainment of software critical for managing and maintaining naval fleets. The geographic impact is primarily within Texas, where the contractor is located, and wherever the Navy's fleets utilizing this software are deployed. Workforce implications include employment opportunities within Bell Boeing and potentially its subcontractors, particularly in software development and maintenance roles.

Waste & Efficiency Indicators

Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10

Warning Flags

  • Sole-source award limits price competition and potentially increases costs for taxpayers.
  • Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract type can incentivize cost overruns if not closely monitored.
  • Lack of transparency in the procurement process due to sole-source nature.
  • Long contract duration without competitive re-evaluation poses a risk to ongoing value.
  • Absence of small business participation requirements could limit opportunities for smaller firms.

Positive Signals

  • Contract addresses a critical need for fleet sustainment software, indicating essential operational support.
  • Award to Bell Boeing suggests a reliance on established expertise for complex defense systems.
  • The fixed fee component, while part of a cost-plus structure, provides some level of cost predictability.
  • Long-term contract provides stability for sustainment efforts and contractor planning.

Sector Analysis

The 'Other Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing' sector encompasses a wide range of activities supporting the aerospace industry. This contract, focusing on software sustainment for naval fleets, represents a specialized niche within this broader category. The market for defense-related software sustainment is often characterized by long-term relationships, high barriers to entry due to security and technical requirements, and a significant portion of spending directed towards sole-source or limited-competition contracts. Comparable spending benchmarks are difficult to establish without more specific details on the software's function and scope.

Small Business Impact

This contract does not appear to include specific small business set-asides, as indicated by 'sb': false. The sole-source nature of the award further limits opportunities for small businesses to participate directly as prime contractors. While Bell Boeing may engage small businesses as subcontractors, the absence of explicit subcontracting requirements or goals means their inclusion is not guaranteed. This could represent a missed opportunity to foster innovation and competition within the small business defense contracting ecosystem.

Oversight & Accountability

Oversight for this contract would primarily fall under the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy's contracting and program management offices. Given the 'cost plus fixed fee' structure, rigorous financial oversight and auditing by the government are crucial to ensure costs are reasonable and allocable. Transparency is limited due to the sole-source nature. Inspector General jurisdiction would apply to investigate any allegations of fraud, waste, or abuse related to the contract.

Related Government Programs

  • Naval Fleet Management Systems
  • Defense Software Development Contracts
  • Aerospace Sustainment Services
  • Department of Defense IT Procurement
  • Cost-Plus Contract Vehicles

Risk Flags

  • Sole-source award may limit competition and increase costs.
  • Cost-plus contract type carries inherent risk of cost overruns.
  • Lack of performance data makes value assessment difficult.
  • Potential for technological obsolescence due to long contract duration.

Tags

defense, department-of-defense, department-of-the-navy, sole-source, cost-plus-fixed-fee, software, fleet-sustainment, bell-boeing, texas, other-aircraft-parts-and-auxiliary-equipment-manufacturing, delivery-order

Frequently Asked Questions

What is this federal contract paying for?

Department of Defense awarded $75.5 million to BELL BOEING JOINT PROJECT OFFICE. 2019 FLEET SUSTAINMENT SOFTWARE

Who is the contractor on this award?

The obligated recipient is BELL BOEING JOINT PROJECT OFFICE.

Which agency awarded this contract?

Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Department of the Navy).

What is the total obligated amount?

The obligated amount is $75.5 million.

What is the period of performance?

Start: 2017-02-14. End: 2024-09-30.

What specific capabilities does the '2019 FLEET SUSTAINMENT SOFTWARE' provide to the Department of the Navy?

The provided data does not detail the specific functionalities of the '2019 FLEET SUSTAINMENT SOFTWARE'. However, based on the contract title and its award to Bell Boeing, it is highly probable that the software is designed to support the maintenance, operational readiness, logistics, and lifecycle management of naval fleet assets. This could include functions such as predictive maintenance scheduling, inventory management for spare parts, performance monitoring of vessels and aircraft, and integration with other naval command and control systems. The 'sustainment' aspect implies ongoing support, updates, and potentially upgrades to ensure the software remains effective and secure throughout its operational life.

Why was this contract awarded on a sole-source basis instead of through full and open competition?

The data indicates the contract was awarded as 'NOT COMPETED' and is 'sole-source'. Specific justifications for sole-source awards are not provided in the data but typically fall under specific exceptions in federal acquisition regulations. Common reasons include that only one responsible source exists with the unique capability to meet the requirement, or that a critical need exists that cannot be satisfied through competitive means in a timely manner. For a defense contractor like Bell Boeing, it might be argued that they possess unique intellectual property, proprietary technology, or an established integration with existing naval systems that no other vendor can replicate, thus necessitating a sole-source award to ensure continuity of operations or access to specialized expertise.

How does the 'cost plus fixed fee' (CPFF) contract type compare to other contract types in terms of risk and value for money?

The Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract type is often used for research and development or complex services where the scope of work is not precisely defined at the outset. Under CPFF, the contractor is reimbursed for allowable costs plus a predetermined fixed fee representing profit. This structure shifts some cost risk to the government, as the contractor is incentivized to complete the work but not necessarily to minimize costs beyond what is necessary to achieve the fixed fee. Compared to Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contracts, CPFF offers more flexibility but less cost certainty for the government. Compared to Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF), the profit is fixed, removing the direct incentive to control costs beyond the baseline established for the fee. For value for money, CPFF can be effective if the government exercises strong oversight to ensure costs are reasonable and allocable, but it carries a higher risk of cost overruns than FFP.

What is the historical spending pattern for 'Fleet Sustainment Software' within the Department of the Navy or Department of Defense?

The provided data only includes details for this specific contract award (NA 336413). It does not offer historical spending data for 'Fleet Sustainment Software' or similar categories within the Department of the Navy or the broader Department of Defense. To analyze historical spending patterns, one would need access to a larger dataset encompassing multiple contract awards over several fiscal years, potentially filtered by Product Service Code (PSC) or Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) categories related to software sustainment and fleet management. Without such data, it's impossible to determine if the $75.5 million awarded here represents an increase, decrease, or stable level of investment in this area.

What are the potential implications of the contract's long duration (ending in 2024) on technological relevance and future sustainment needs?

A contract duration extending to September 30, 2024, for a software system initiated around 2017, represents a significant period in the fast-paced world of technology. The primary implication is the risk of technological obsolescence. Software developed or sustained under older paradigms may struggle to keep pace with advancements in areas like cloud computing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity threats, and user interface design. This could lead to the software becoming less efficient, harder to maintain, or vulnerable. Furthermore, the Navy's future sustainment needs might evolve beyond the scope of the current contract, potentially requiring significant modifications or a complete replacement of the system, which could incur additional costs and transition challenges.

How does the contractor, Bell Boeing Joint Project Office, typically perform on similar Department of Defense contracts?

The provided data does not include performance metrics or past performance ratings for Bell Boeing Joint Project Office on this or other contracts. Bell Boeing is a well-established entity within the defense industry, known for its work on military aircraft like the V-22 Osprey. However, assessing their typical performance on software sustainment contracts requires access to contractor performance assessment reporting (CPARs) or other qualitative and quantitative performance data. Without this information, it is impossible to evaluate their track record specifically for this type of service, which could be a significant factor in the justification for a sole-source award.

Industry Classification

NAICS: ManufacturingAerospace Product and Parts ManufacturingOther Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing

Product/Service Code: AEROSPACE CRAFT AND STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS

Competition & Pricing

Extent Competed: NOT COMPETED

Solicitation Procedures: ONLY ONE SOURCE

Offers Received: 1

Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE (U)

Evaluated Preference: NONE

Contractor Details

Address: 401 TILTROTOR DR PLANT A, AMARILLO, TX, 79111

Business Categories: Category Business, Manufacturer of Goods, Not Designated a Small Business, Special Designations, U.S.-Owned Business

Financial Breakdown

Contract Ceiling: $81,768,238

Exercised Options: $81,696,954

Current Obligation: $75,484,329

Subaward Activity

Number of Subawards: 32

Total Subaward Amount: $6,954,298

Contract Characteristics

Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS/SERVICES PROCEDURES NOT USED

Cost or Pricing Data: YES

Parent Contract

Parent Award PIID: N0001917G0002

IDV Type: BOA

Timeline

Start Date: 2017-02-14

Current End Date: 2024-09-30

Potential End Date: 2024-09-30 00:00:00

Last Modified: 2025-07-09

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