DoD's $780M Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey contract awarded in 2003 shows long-term commitment to aircraft manufacturing
Contract Overview
Contract Amount: $780,345,562 ($780.3M)
Contractor: Bell Boeing Joint Project Office
Awarding Agency: Department of Defense
Start Date: 2003-05-15
End Date: 2011-12-31
Contract Duration: 3,152 days
Daily Burn Rate: $247.6K/day
Competition Type: NOT COMPETED
Number of Offers Received: 1
Pricing Type: FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE
Sector: Defense
Place of Performance
Location: AMARILLO, POTTER County, TEXAS, 79111
State: Texas Government Spending
Plain-Language Summary
Department of Defense obligated $780.3 million to BELL BOEING JOINT PROJECT OFFICE for work described as: Key points: 1. The contract's substantial value indicates a significant investment in advanced aviation technology. 2. Awarded as a sole-source contract, it suggests limited initial competition for this specific aircraft. 3. The long duration of the contract (over 8 years) points to a sustained need and development cycle. 4. Fixed Price Incentive pricing suggests a balance between cost control and contractor performance incentives. 5. The contract's focus on aircraft manufacturing places it within a critical defense sector. 6. The absence of small business set-asides may indicate a focus on large prime contractors for this specialized work.
Value Assessment
Rating: fair
This contract represents a large, long-term investment in a complex defense system. Benchmarking its value is challenging without specific performance metrics or comparable sole-source awards for similar aircraft. The fixed-price incentive structure aims to manage costs, but the overall value for money depends heavily on the V-22's operational effectiveness and lifecycle costs, which are subject to ongoing evaluation.
Cost Per Unit: N/A
Competition Analysis
Competition Level: sole-source
This contract was awarded on a sole-source basis, indicating that only one bidder, the Bell-Boeing Joint Project Office, was considered capable of fulfilling the requirement at the time of award. This approach is often used for highly specialized or technologically unique defense systems where competition is limited by existing capabilities or intellectual property. The lack of multiple bidders means price discovery was not driven by a competitive market.
Taxpayer Impact: Sole-source awards can potentially lead to higher costs for taxpayers compared to competitively bid contracts, as the government lacks the leverage of multiple offers to drive down prices.
Public Impact
The primary beneficiaries are the U.S. Department of Defense, specifically branches requiring advanced tiltrotor aircraft capabilities. The contract delivers critical components and manufacturing services for the V-22 Osprey aircraft, enhancing military transport and special operations. The geographic impact is concentrated in areas of V-22 Osprey production and maintenance, primarily Texas. Workforce implications include employment for highly skilled engineers, technicians, and manufacturing personnel within the aerospace industry.
Waste & Efficiency Indicators
Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10
Warning Flags
- Sole-source award limits competitive pressure on pricing.
- Long contract duration may obscure potential cost efficiencies over time.
- Complexity of the V-22 program introduces inherent technical and schedule risks.
Positive Signals
- Fixed Price Incentive contract type aims to align contractor and government interests on cost and performance.
- Sustained award indicates a critical capability being met for the DoD.
- Bell-Boeing's established expertise in aerospace manufacturing.
Sector Analysis
The V-22 Osprey falls within the broader Aircraft Manufacturing sector, a key component of the U.S. defense industrial base. This sector is characterized by high barriers to entry, significant R&D investment, and long production cycles. Spending in this area is heavily influenced by defense budgets and strategic priorities. Comparable spending benchmarks would involve other major military aircraft development and production contracts, often running into hundreds of millions or billions of dollars over their lifecycles.
Small Business Impact
This contract does not appear to have included specific small business set-asides, which is common for large, complex defense manufacturing programs requiring specialized capabilities. The prime contractor, Bell-Boeing, would be responsible for any subcontracting, and while they may engage small businesses, there is no explicit mandate within this award. The impact on the small business ecosystem is indirect, relying on the prime's subcontracting strategy.
Oversight & Accountability
Oversight for this contract would have been managed by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), responsible for ensuring compliance with contract terms, quality standards, and delivery schedules. Accountability measures are embedded in the Fixed Price Incentive contract type, linking contractor profit to performance. Transparency is generally limited for sole-source defense contracts, though program-level reviews and reporting are standard.
Related Government Programs
- V-22 Osprey Program
- DoD Aircraft Procurement
- Aerospace Manufacturing Contracts
- Defense Contract Management
Risk Flags
- Sole-source award
- Long contract duration
- High-cost platform
Tags
defense, department-of-defense, bell-boeing, v-22-osprey, aircraft-manufacturing, definitive-contract, fixed-price-incentive, sole-source, texas, large-contract, long-duration
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this federal contract paying for?
Department of Defense awarded $780.3 million to BELL BOEING JOINT PROJECT OFFICE. See the official description on USAspending.
Who is the contractor on this award?
The obligated recipient is BELL BOEING JOINT PROJECT OFFICE.
Which agency awarded this contract?
Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Defense Contract Management Agency).
What is the total obligated amount?
The obligated amount is $780.3 million.
What is the period of performance?
Start: 2003-05-15. End: 2011-12-31.
What was the historical spending trend for the V-22 Osprey program prior to and following this contract award?
Detailed historical spending data for the V-22 Osprey program prior to and following the May 2003 award of this specific $780 million contract is not directly available in the provided data. However, the V-22 program itself has a long and complex history, with development beginning in the 1980s and facing significant challenges and cost overruns. This contract likely represents a significant tranche of funding for production and sustainment during a specific period (2003-2011). Broader DoD budget documents and program management reports would be necessary to trace the full spending trajectory across different phases and contract types over the program's lifespan. The $780 million figure indicates a substantial commitment during its operational period.
How does the per-unit cost of the V-22 Osprey under this contract compare to similar tiltrotor or heavy-lift aircraft programs?
Direct per-unit cost comparisons for the V-22 Osprey under this specific contract are difficult without detailed breakdowns of the $780 million award and the number of units produced within that timeframe. The V-22 is a unique platform, and direct comparisons to other tiltrotor or heavy-lift aircraft are challenging due to differences in mission capabilities, technology, and production volumes. Historically, the V-22 has been a high-cost aircraft, with unit costs often cited as significantly higher than conventional helicopters or transport planes. Programmatic reports and defense budget analyses often highlight the V-22's cost as a point of discussion, reflecting its advanced capabilities and complex development.
What were the primary risks identified during the performance of this contract, and how were they mitigated?
Given the V-22 Osprey's history, primary risks associated with this contract likely included technical challenges in manufacturing and integration, potential schedule delays, and cost overruns, despite the Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) structure. Mitigation strategies would have involved close oversight by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), regular program reviews, and the incentive clauses within the FPI contract itself, which aim to motivate the contractor to meet cost and performance targets. The long duration (2003-2011) suggests that managing these risks was an ongoing process throughout the contract period. Specific risk mitigation plans are typically detailed in program management documentation.
What is the track record of Bell-Boeing Joint Project Office in delivering complex aircraft manufacturing contracts of this scale?
Bell-Boeing, as a joint venture, has a significant track record in delivering complex aircraft, most notably the V-22 Osprey itself. They have been the sole entity responsible for the development, production, and sustainment of this unique tiltrotor aircraft. While the V-22 program has faced its share of challenges, including developmental hurdles and cost issues, Bell-Boeing has ultimately delivered operational aircraft to the U.S. military. Their experience spans decades in aerospace manufacturing, encompassing design, engineering, production, and integration of sophisticated aviation systems, positioning them as a key player in large-scale defense aerospace contracts.
How has the funding for the V-22 Osprey program evolved since the initial award of this contract in 2003?
Since the initial award of this $780 million contract in 2003, funding for the V-22 Osprey program has continued, reflecting its ongoing operational importance and planned fleet expansion. Subsequent years have seen further appropriations for production, upgrades, and sustainment. While specific annual figures fluctuate based on defense budgets and program priorities, the V-22 has remained a funded program. The total program cost has grown considerably over its lifecycle, encompassing numerous contracts beyond this initial definitive award. The trend indicates sustained, albeit sometimes debated, investment in the V-22 capability.
Industry Classification
NAICS: Manufacturing › Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing › Aircraft Manufacturing
Product/Service Code: AEROSPACE CRAFT AND STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS
Competition & Pricing
Extent Competed: NOT COMPETED
Offers Received: 1
Pricing Type: FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE (L)
Contractor Details
Address: 47123 BUSE RD BUILDING 227, PATUXENT RIVER, MD, 20670
Business Categories: Category Business, Not Designated a Small Business
Contract Characteristics
Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL ITEM PROCEDURES NOT USED
Cost or Pricing Data: NO
Timeline
Start Date: 2003-05-15
Current End Date: 2011-12-31
Potential End Date: 2011-12-31 00:00:00
Last Modified: 2019-07-09
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