DoD's $392M R&D contract with Northrop Grumman shows fair value, but limited competition raises concerns
Contract Overview
Contract Amount: $39,228,509 ($39.2M)
Contractor: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation
Awarding Agency: Department of Defense
Start Date: 2006-09-28
End Date: 2012-04-30
Contract Duration: 2,041 days
Daily Burn Rate: $19.2K/day
Competition Type: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION
Number of Offers Received: 26
Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE
Sector: R&D
Place of Performance
Location: LINTHICUM HEIGHTS, ANNE ARUNDEL County, MARYLAND, 21090
State: Maryland Government Spending
Plain-Language Summary
Department of Defense obligated $39.2 million to NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORPORATION for work described as: Key points: 1. Contract value of $392M over 6 years suggests significant investment in advanced research. 2. The 'Cost Plus Fixed Fee' structure may incentivize cost overruns if not closely monitored. 3. Limited competition indicates potential for higher prices and reduced innovation. 4. Northrop Grumman's extensive experience in defense R&D positions them well for this contract. 5. The contract's duration and scope present moderate performance risks. 6. Spending is concentrated in Maryland, impacting the local economy and workforce. 7. The absence of small business set-asides limits opportunities for smaller innovative firms.
Value Assessment
Rating: fair
Benchmarking this $392M contract against similar large-scale R&D efforts is challenging due to its specific nature. However, the Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) pricing structure, while common for R&D, carries inherent risks of cost escalation. Without detailed cost breakdowns and performance metrics, assessing true value-for-money is difficult. The fixed fee component provides some incentive for the contractor to control costs, but the overall cost ceiling remains a critical factor for taxpayer protection.
Cost Per Unit: N/A
Competition Analysis
Competition Level: limited
The contract was awarded under 'FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION', but the low number of bidders (26 bids received for an unspecified number of awards, with Northrop Grumman being one of them) suggests that the pool of qualified contractors may be limited for this highly specialized R&D. This level of competition, while not a sole-source award, may not have driven the most aggressive pricing. Further analysis would be needed to understand if the solicitation's requirements inadvertently restricted competition.
Taxpayer Impact: Limited competition can lead to higher costs for taxpayers as the government may have fewer options to negotiate favorable terms. It also reduces the pressure on contractors to offer their most competitive pricing.
Public Impact
The primary beneficiary is the Department of Defense, which gains access to advanced research capabilities. Services delivered include cutting-edge research and development in physical, engineering, and life sciences. Geographic impact is concentrated in Maryland, potentially creating high-skilled jobs and economic activity in the region. Workforce implications include the creation or sustainment of specialized R&D roles within Northrop Grumman and potentially its subcontractors.
Waste & Efficiency Indicators
Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10
Warning Flags
- Cost overruns are a risk with CPFF contracts if not rigorously managed.
- Limited competition may result in suboptimal pricing for the government.
- The specialized nature of the R&D could lead to contractor lock-in.
- Performance monitoring is critical to ensure research objectives are met within budget.
- Dependence on a single large contractor for critical R&D can be a strategic risk.
Positive Signals
- Northrop Grumman is a well-established defense contractor with a strong track record in R&D.
- The contract aims to advance critical technological capabilities for national security.
- The fixed fee component provides a degree of cost certainty for the government.
- The research is likely to yield advancements with potential dual-use applications.
- The contract duration allows for sustained focus on complex research problems.
Sector Analysis
This contract falls within the Research and Development (R&D) sector, specifically focusing on physical, engineering, and life sciences. The defense R&D market is characterized by high barriers to entry, significant government investment, and a focus on technological innovation. Comparable spending benchmarks are difficult to establish without knowing the specific R&D area, but multi-year, multi-million dollar contracts are typical for major defense contractors like Northrop Grumman undertaking advanced research.
Small Business Impact
The data indicates this contract was not set aside for small businesses (ss: false, sb: false). This means large businesses like Northrop Grumman were the primary targets. While large prime contractors often engage small businesses as subcontractors, the absence of a specific set-aside means direct opportunities for small businesses to compete for the prime contract are limited. This could impact the broader small business innovation ecosystem if they are excluded from prime roles on significant R&D initiatives.
Oversight & Accountability
Oversight for this contract would likely be managed by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), given its role in contract administration for the Department of Defense. Accountability measures would be tied to the Cost Plus Fixed Fee terms, requiring detailed reporting on costs and progress. Transparency is generally limited in defense R&D contracts due to proprietary information and national security concerns, though contract award details and high-level progress reports may be publicly available. Inspector General jurisdiction would apply if fraud, waste, or abuse were suspected.
Related Government Programs
- Advanced Technology Development
- Research and Development Services
- Defense Science and Technology
- Engineering Services
- Aerospace Research
- Systems Engineering
Risk Flags
- Cost Overrun Risk
- Limited Competition Impact
- Contractor Performance Uncertainty
- Technological Obsolescence
- Scope Creep Potential
Tags
defense, department-of-defense, northrop-grumman, research-and-development, cost-plus-fixed-fee, definitive-contract, full-and-open-competition, maryland, large-contract, technology-development
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this federal contract paying for?
Department of Defense awarded $39.2 million to NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORPORATION. See the official description on USAspending.
Who is the contractor on this award?
The obligated recipient is NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORPORATION.
Which agency awarded this contract?
Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Defense Contract Management Agency).
What is the total obligated amount?
The obligated amount is $39.2 million.
What is the period of performance?
Start: 2006-09-28. End: 2012-04-30.
What is Northrop Grumman's track record with similar Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) R&D contracts with the Department of Defense?
Northrop Grumman has a long history of performing complex R&D contracts, including many under CPFF arrangements, for the Department of Defense and other federal agencies. Their extensive experience in areas like aerospace, defense systems, and advanced technologies suggests a familiarity with the requirements and challenges of such contracts. Historically, CPFF contracts with large, established contractors like Northrop Grumman can be managed effectively, but they also carry a persistent risk of cost overruns if oversight is not diligent. Analyzing specific past performance data, including any instances of cost variances or contract modifications, would provide a clearer picture of their performance in managing R&D budgets and timelines under this pricing structure.
How does the $392 million contract value compare to other large-scale R&D investments by the DoD in recent years?
The $392 million contract value over approximately six years places this award among significant R&D investments by the Department of Defense. While not the largest single R&D contract, it represents a substantial commitment to a specific research area. The DoD's annual R&D spending typically runs into the tens of billions of dollars, encompassing a wide array of projects from basic research to advanced technology development. Contracts of this magnitude are often awarded to major defense contractors for critical technology advancements. Benchmarking requires comparing the specific technological domain and scope of work, but this contract is indicative of the substantial resources the DoD allocates to maintaining a technological edge.
What are the primary risks associated with the 'Cost Plus Fixed Fee' (CPFF) pricing model for this contract?
The primary risk with a CPFF contract is the potential for cost overruns. While the contractor is paid their actual allowable costs plus a fixed fee, the government bears the risk of cost increases. The fixed fee provides an incentive for the contractor to control costs to maximize their profit margin (as the fee is fixed regardless of the final cost). However, if the R&D proves more complex or expensive than initially estimated, the total contract cost can escalate significantly. Effective risk mitigation requires robust government oversight, detailed cost tracking, and clear definition of contract scope to prevent scope creep, which could further inflate costs.
Given the 'limited' competition, what is the potential impact on innovation and the development of alternative solutions?
Limited competition, even when stemming from a 'full and open' solicitation, can stifle innovation. When fewer bidders are involved, there is less pressure to develop novel approaches or offer disruptive technologies to win the contract. The incumbent or favored contractor may have an advantage due to established relationships or specific expertise that deters others. This can lead to incremental improvements rather than breakthrough innovations. Furthermore, it may limit the government's exposure to a wider range of technological solutions and potentially prevent the emergence of new players in critical R&D areas, thereby concentrating technological development within a smaller group of firms.
What are the implications of this contract being awarded in Maryland (st: MD, sn: MARYLAND)?
Awarding a significant R&D contract like this in Maryland has several implications. Maryland is a hub for defense contracting and technology, meaning there is likely a skilled workforce available to support the contract's needs. The presence of Northrop Grumman and this substantial contract can stimulate economic activity in the region, potentially creating or sustaining high-paying jobs in research, engineering, and related fields. It also reinforces Maryland's position within the national defense industrial base. However, it also concentrates a significant portion of federal R&D spending in one geographic area, which could be a point of consideration for broader economic impact analysis across different regions.
How does the absence of small business participation (ss: false, sb: false) affect the broader R&D ecosystem?
The absence of small business set-asides (sb: false) and the contract not being designated for small business participation (ss: false) means that opportunities for smaller, potentially more agile firms to compete for the prime contract are non-existent. While large contractors like Northrop Grumman often utilize small businesses as subcontractors, this approach bypasses the potential for small businesses to lead innovation and capture prime contract value. This can limit the growth and development of the small business R&D sector, potentially hindering the infusion of novel ideas and technologies that smaller firms are often known for. It concentrates prime contract awards among established large corporations.
Industry Classification
NAICS: Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services › Scientific Research and Development Services › Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences
Product/Service Code: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT › C – National Defense R&D Services
Competition & Pricing
Extent Competed: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION
Solicitation Procedures: BASIC RESEARCH
Offers Received: 26
Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE (U)
Evaluated Preference: NONE
Contractor Details
Parent Company: Northrop Grumman Corporation (UEI: 967356127)
Address: 1580A NURSERY RD, LINTHICUM HEIG, MD, 21090
Business Categories: Category Business, Not Designated a Small Business
Contract Characteristics
Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL ITEM PROCEDURES NOT USED
Cost or Pricing Data: YES
Timeline
Start Date: 2006-09-28
Current End Date: 2012-04-30
Potential End Date: 2012-04-30 00:00:00
Last Modified: 2016-08-03
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