DoD's Missile Defense Agency awards $6.9M R&D contract to Georgia Tech Applied Research Corp

Contract Overview

Contract Amount: $6,885,718 ($6.9M)

Contractor: Georgia Tech Applied Research Corp

Awarding Agency: Department of Defense

Start Date: 2022-04-01

End Date: 2026-09-28

Contract Duration: 1,641 days

Daily Burn Rate: $4.2K/day

Competition Type: NOT COMPETED

Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE

Sector: R&D

Official Description: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Place of Performance

Location: ATLANTA, FULTON County, GEORGIA, 30318

State: Georgia Government Spending

Plain-Language Summary

Department of Defense obligated $6.9 million to GEORGIA TECH APPLIED RESEARCH CORP for work described as: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Key points: 1. Contract focuses on physical, engineering, and life sciences R&D, excluding specialized fields. 2. Sole-source award to Georgia Tech Applied Research Corp. raises questions about competition. 3. Contract duration of over 4 years suggests a significant, long-term research effort. 4. Cost-plus-fixed-fee pricing structure may incentivize cost overruns if not closely managed. 5. Geographic concentration in Georgia for this significant federal research investment. 6. Missile Defense Agency's reliance on a single entity for this research warrants scrutiny.

Value Assessment

Rating: questionable

The contract value of $6.9 million for R&D services is moderate. Without specific benchmarks for comparable research projects within the Missile Defense Agency or similar defense R&D efforts, assessing value for money is challenging. The cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract type, while common for R&D where scope can evolve, carries inherent risks of cost escalation if not rigorously monitored. The absence of competitive bidding further complicates a direct value assessment.

Cost Per Unit: N/A

Competition Analysis

Competition Level: sole-source

This contract was awarded on a sole-source basis, meaning it was not competed among multiple vendors. This approach is typically justified when a specific entity possesses unique capabilities or is the only responsible source. However, it limits the potential for price discovery through competition and may result in higher costs for the government compared to a fully competed award. The rationale for this sole-source determination should be clearly documented and justified.

Taxpayer Impact: Sole-source awards mean taxpayers do not benefit from the cost savings that competitive bidding typically generates. This can lead to less efficient use of public funds if alternative, more cost-effective solutions were available.

Public Impact

The primary beneficiary is the Department of Defense, specifically the Missile Defense Agency, which will receive advanced research outcomes. The contract supports research and development in physical, engineering, and life sciences, potentially leading to technological advancements in missile defense. The geographic impact is concentrated in Georgia, where Georgia Tech Applied Research Corp. is located, potentially benefiting the local research and technical workforce. The contract may indirectly benefit the broader scientific and engineering community through knowledge dissemination, though specific publication requirements are not detailed.

Waste & Efficiency Indicators

Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10

Warning Flags

Lack of competition for a significant R&D award limits price discovery and potential cost savings.
Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract type can lead to cost overruns if not managed with strict oversight.
Sole-source justification needs thorough review to ensure no viable alternatives were overlooked.
Limited transparency on specific research deliverables and milestones.

Positive Signals

Award to a reputable research institution (Georgia Tech) suggests a high likelihood of technical expertise.
Long contract duration allows for in-depth research and development.
Focus on critical defense R&D area (missile defense).

Sector Analysis

This contract falls within the Research and Development sector, specifically focusing on physical, engineering, and life sciences. The market for defense R&D is characterized by specialized expertise, long development cycles, and significant government investment. Comparable spending benchmarks are difficult to establish without knowing the precise nature of the research, but R&D contracts within defense agencies often represent substantial portions of their budgets, driving innovation in critical national security areas.

Small Business Impact

This contract does not appear to involve small business set-asides, nor is there information suggesting subcontracting opportunities for small businesses. The award is made directly to Georgia Tech Applied Research Corp., an established research institution. The impact on the small business ecosystem is likely minimal unless Georgia Tech actively engages small businesses as subcontractors, which is not indicated here.

Oversight & Accountability

Oversight for this contract would primarily reside with the Missile Defense Agency's contracting and program management offices. As a sole-source award, the justification and subsequent performance monitoring are critical. Transparency regarding research progress and expenditures would be key accountability measures. Inspector General jurisdiction would apply to any allegations of fraud, waste, or abuse related to the contract.

Related Government Programs

Missile Defense Systems R&D
Advanced Technology Development
Department of Defense Research Contracts
University Research Partnerships

Risk Flags

Sole-source award lacks competitive pricing.
CPFF contract type carries risk of cost overruns.
Limited public information on specific research deliverables.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is this federal contract paying for?

Department of Defense awarded $6.9 million to GEORGIA TECH APPLIED RESEARCH CORP. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Who is the contractor on this award?

The obligated recipient is GEORGIA TECH APPLIED RESEARCH CORP.

Which agency awarded this contract?

Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Missile Defense Agency).

What is the total obligated amount?

The obligated amount is $6.9 million.

What is the period of performance?

Start: 2022-04-01. End: 2026-09-28.

What specific research objectives are outlined in this contract, and how do they align with the Missile Defense Agency's strategic goals?

The provided data indicates the contract is for 'Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (except Nanotechnology and Biotechnology)' under NAICS code 541715. While the specific research objectives are not detailed in the summary data, they are inherently tied to advancing missile defense capabilities. This could encompass areas such as sensor technology, materials science for interceptors, advanced modeling and simulation, or countermeasure development. Alignment with strategic goals would involve assessing how the contracted research contributes to overcoming current or future missile threats, improving system effectiveness, or reducing costs for missile defense systems as per the Missile Defense Agency's mission.

What is the justification for awarding this contract on a sole-source basis to Georgia Tech Applied Research Corp.?

Sole-source awards are typically granted when only one responsible source is available or capable of meeting the government's needs. For Georgia Tech Applied Research Corp., this justification likely stems from its unique research capabilities, specialized facilities, established expertise in specific areas relevant to missile defense, or potentially prior work that makes them the only logical choice. The Missile Defense Agency would have had to document this justification, often involving market research to confirm the absence of other suitable contractors. Without access to the specific justification documentation, it's presumed to be based on unique qualifications or proprietary knowledge.

How does the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract structure potentially impact cost control and contractor performance in this R&D context?

The Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) structure means the contractor is reimbursed for all allowable costs incurred, plus a predetermined fixed fee representing profit. For R&D, this structure is often used because the scope and final costs can be uncertain at the outset. However, it places a significant burden on the government to meticulously monitor and audit costs to ensure they are reasonable and allocable. The 'fixed fee' component provides some incentive for the contractor to control costs, as their profit is capped. Nonetheless, the risk of cost overruns remains higher compared to fixed-price contracts, necessitating robust oversight from the agency to ensure value for money and prevent unnecessary expenditures.

What is the historical spending pattern of the Missile Defense Agency on R&D contracts with Georgia Tech Applied Research Corp. or similar institutions?

The provided data only reflects this specific contract award. To assess historical spending patterns, one would need to access broader contract databases (like USASpending.gov or FPDS) to analyze the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) R&D expenditures over several fiscal years. This analysis should identify the total R&D spending, the proportion allocated to specific research areas (like those covered by NAICS 541715), and the extent to which MDA contracts with Georgia Tech Applied Research Corp. or other academic/research institutions. Understanding these patterns would reveal trends in R&D investment, reliance on specific contractors, and the overall scale of research efforts.

What are the potential risks associated with relying on a single research institution for critical missile defense R&D?

Relying on a single institution for critical R&D carries several risks. Firstly, it can lead to a lack of diverse perspectives and innovative approaches, as different organizations might tackle problems from unique angles. Secondly, it creates a dependency; if the institution faces challenges (e.g., funding issues, loss of key personnel, internal disruptions), the entire research effort could be jeopardized. Thirdly, without competitive pressure, there's a potential for complacency or reduced urgency in delivering results. Finally, it limits the government's ability to benchmark performance and cost against other potential providers, potentially leading to suboptimal value.

Industry Classification

NAICS: Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services › Scientific Research and Development Services › Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (except Nanotechnology and Biotechnology)

Product/Service Code: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT › C – National Defense R&D Services

Competition & Pricing

Extent Competed: NOT COMPETED

Solicitation Procedures: ONLY ONE SOURCE

Solicitation ID: HQ085421R0001

Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE (U)

Evaluated Preference: NONE

Contractor Details

Address: 926 DALNEY ST NW, ATLANTA, GA, 30318

Business Categories: Category Business, Corporate Entity Tax Exempt, Educational Institution, Higher Education, Nonprofit Organization, Not Designated a Small Business, Higher Education (Public), Special Designations, U.S.-Owned Business

Financial Breakdown

Contract Ceiling: $8,672,225

Exercised Options: $8,672,225

Current Obligation: $6,885,718

Actual Outlays: $3,512,723

Contract Characteristics

Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS/SERVICES PROCEDURES NOT USED

Cost or Pricing Data: NO

Parent Contract

Parent Award PIID: HQ085421D0002

IDV Type: IDC

Timeline