GSA's $35.6M Engineering Services Contract for AFRL RZ Shows Moderate Competition and Long Duration

Contract Overview

Contract Amount: $35,612,945 ($35.6M)

Contractor: Baistar Mechanical, Inc.

Awarding Agency: General Services Administration

Start Date: 2012-04-04

End Date: 2018-06-17

Contract Duration: 2,265 days

Daily Burn Rate: $15.7K/day

Competition Type: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION AFTER EXCLUSION OF SOURCES

Number of Offers Received: 3

Pricing Type: FIRM FIXED PRICE

Sector: R&D

Official Description: AFRL RZ ENGINEERING SUPPORT SERVICES IGF::OT::IGF

Place of Performance

Location: DAYTON, GREENE County, OHIO, 45433

State: Ohio Government Spending

Plain-Language Summary

General Services Administration obligated $35.6 million to BAISTAR MECHANICAL, INC. for work described as: AFRL RZ ENGINEERING SUPPORT SERVICES IGF::OT::IGF Key points: 1. The contract's duration of 2265 days (over 6 years) suggests a need for sustained engineering support. 2. A firm-fixed-price contract type generally shifts risk to the contractor, potentially leading to more predictable costs. 3. The award was made under 'Full and Open Competition After Exclusion of Sources,' indicating a competitive process but with specific exclusions. 4. The number of bids received (3) suggests moderate competition, which could impact price negotiation. 5. The contract's value of over $35 million over its lifespan warrants scrutiny of its overall value for money. 6. The geographic location in Ohio (OH) may indicate a focus on specific AFRL facilities or regional engineering needs.

Value Assessment

Rating: fair

Benchmarking the value of this contract is challenging without more specific details on the engineering services provided. The total award value of $35.6 million over more than six years averages to approximately $5.9 million annually. This figure needs to be compared against the cost of similar engineering support services procured by other government agencies or within the private sector for comparable scope and complexity. The firm-fixed-price nature of the contract is a positive indicator for cost control, but the actual value for money depends on the quality and efficiency of the services delivered.

Cost Per Unit: N/A

Competition Analysis

Competition Level: limited

The contract was awarded under 'Full and Open Competition After Exclusion of Sources.' This procurement method implies that while the competition was intended to be broad, certain sources were excluded for specific reasons, potentially related to technical capabilities, security clearances, or prior performance. With three bids received, the competition level was moderate, suggesting that while multiple companies were interested, the pool of eligible bidders might have been constrained. This level of competition can influence price discovery, potentially leading to prices that are not as low as they might be in a completely unrestricted full and open competition.

Taxpayer Impact: A moderate level of competition means taxpayers may not be receiving the absolute lowest possible price, as the exclusion of certain sources could have limited the bidding pool. However, it also suggests that the selected contractor was deemed the best value among the eligible and competing firms.

Public Impact

The primary beneficiaries are the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) facilities, which receive essential engineering support services. The contract delivers specialized engineering expertise crucial for research, development, and testing activities. The geographic impact is concentrated in Ohio (OH), where the AFRL facilities requiring these services are located. The contract supports a workforce of engineers and technical specialists, contributing to employment in the engineering sector.

Waste & Efficiency Indicators

Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10

Warning Flags

  • The 'Exclusion of Sources' in the competition method warrants further investigation to understand the rationale and potential impact on competition.
  • The long contract duration (over 6 years) could lead to potential cost overruns if not managed effectively, despite the fixed-price nature.
  • Without detailed performance metrics, it's difficult to assess the true value for money delivered by the contractor.

Positive Signals

  • The use of a firm-fixed-price contract shifts performance risk to the contractor, encouraging efficiency.
  • The procurement process, even with exclusions, involved multiple bidders, indicating some level of market engagement.
  • The contract supports critical research and development activities for the Air Force, aligning with national defense objectives.

Sector Analysis

This contract falls within the Engineering Services sector (NAICS code 541330), a significant segment of government contracting supporting defense and research initiatives. The market for engineering services is competitive, with numerous firms offering specialized expertise. The total federal spending on engineering services is substantial, and contracts like this one are crucial for maintaining the technological edge of military research laboratories. Benchmarking this contract's value would involve comparing its per-year cost against similar long-term engineering support contracts awarded by the Department of Defense or other federal agencies.

Small Business Impact

The contract details indicate that small business participation was not a primary focus, as the 'ss' (small business set-aside) and 'sb' (small business) flags are false. There is no explicit mention of subcontracting requirements for small businesses within the provided data. This suggests that the prime contractor is likely a larger entity, and opportunities for small businesses to participate in this specific contract may be limited unless they are sought out as subcontractors by the awardee. Further investigation into subcontracting plans would be necessary to fully assess the impact on the small business ecosystem.

Oversight & Accountability

Oversight for this contract would primarily fall under the purview of the General Services Administration (GSA) and the specific Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) program office that the services support. As a purchase order issued through GSA's Federal Acquisition Service, it is subject to GSA's contract administration and oversight protocols. Transparency is facilitated through contract databases like FPDS. Accountability measures would be embedded in the contract's performance clauses and the firm-fixed-price structure, which incentivizes the contractor to meet defined objectives within budget. Specific Inspector General jurisdiction would depend on whether the AFRL program itself falls under a particular IG's mandate.

Related Government Programs

  • AFRL Engineering Support Services
  • Air Force Research Laboratory Contracts
  • Engineering Services for Defense
  • General Services Administration Contracts
  • Federal Acquisition Service Contracts

Risk Flags

  • Competition Exclusions
  • Long Contract Duration
  • Potential for Scope Creep
  • Value for Money Assessment Needed

Tags

engineering-services, research-and-development, air-force, afrl, general-services-administration, gsa, purchase-order, firm-fixed-price, limited-competition, ohio, defense, long-term-contract

Frequently Asked Questions

What is this federal contract paying for?

General Services Administration awarded $35.6 million to BAISTAR MECHANICAL, INC.. AFRL RZ ENGINEERING SUPPORT SERVICES IGF::OT::IGF

Who is the contractor on this award?

The obligated recipient is BAISTAR MECHANICAL, INC..

Which agency awarded this contract?

Awarding agency: General Services Administration (Federal Acquisition Service).

What is the total obligated amount?

The obligated amount is $35.6 million.

What is the period of performance?

Start: 2012-04-04. End: 2018-06-17.

What specific engineering services were provided under this contract, and how do they align with AFRL's mission?

The contract, identified as 'AFRL RZ ENGINEERING SUPPORT SERVICES IGF::OT::IGF,' indicates that the services provided were engineering support for the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), specifically within the 'RZ' designation, which likely refers to a particular directorate or program. While the exact nature of 'RZ' is not detailed in the provided data, AFRL's broader mission involves developing advanced technologies for air and space superiority. Therefore, the engineering services likely encompassed areas such as research, design, analysis, testing, and technical consultation related to aerospace systems, materials science, or other advanced technological domains critical to the Air Force's future capabilities. The firm-fixed-price nature suggests a defined scope of work was established to ensure cost predictability for these essential R&D support functions.

How does the $35.6 million award value compare to similar engineering support contracts for AFRL or other defense research labs?

Comparing the $35.6 million award value for this 6-year contract requires context regarding the scope and complexity of the engineering services. On average, this contract represents an annual expenditure of approximately $5.9 million. Similar long-term engineering support contracts for defense research laboratories can range significantly. For instance, contracts for broad scientific research support might exceed $50 million annually, while more specialized, niche engineering tasks could be in the low millions. Without knowing the specific technical requirements and deliverables for AFRL RZ, a precise benchmark is difficult. However, the $5.9 million annual average suggests a substantial, ongoing need for specialized engineering expertise, placing it in the mid-to-high tier for sustained support contracts of this nature.

What are the potential risks associated with a firm-fixed-price contract of this duration and value?

While firm-fixed-price (FFP) contracts are generally favored for cost control, a long-duration (over 6 years) FFP contract valued at $35.6 million carries specific risks. The primary risk is that the contractor may underestimate the costs or encounter unforeseen technical challenges, leading to reduced profit margins or potential financial distress for the contractor. Conversely, if the contractor significantly overestimates costs, the government may end up paying a premium. Scope creep, if not managed meticulously through contract modifications, can also erode the benefits of FFP. Furthermore, the long duration might mean the technology or requirements evolve, potentially making the contracted services less relevant or requiring costly adjustments. The 'Exclusion of Sources' aspect also introduces a risk if the excluded sources possessed unique capabilities that are now missed.

What does the 'Full and Open Competition After Exclusion of Sources' procurement method imply about the contractor selection process?

The 'Full and Open Competition After Exclusion of Sources' (FOUC-ES) method indicates that the solicitation was initially intended for broad competition, but specific sources were subsequently excluded. This exclusion could be based on various factors, such as the need for highly specialized knowledge, unique technical capabilities, specific security clearances, or prior performance issues with certain contractors. The process aimed to ensure that the competition, among the remaining eligible sources, was as robust as possible. Receiving three bids suggests that despite the exclusions, there was sufficient interest and capability within the eligible pool to foster a competitive environment, allowing the government to select the best value offer from the available bidders.

What is the historical spending pattern for engineering services at AFRL or GSA, and how does this contract fit in?

Historical spending data for engineering services at AFRL and GSA would reveal trends in procurement for R&D support. AFRL, as a major research entity, consistently requires significant engineering support across various disciplines. GSA, through its Federal Acquisition Service, facilitates numerous such procurements. Analyzing past contracts would show whether spending on engineering services has been increasing, decreasing, or remaining stable. This $35.6 million contract, spanning over six years, represents a significant, long-term investment in engineering capabilities for AFRL. Its value and duration suggest it aligns with a sustained strategic need rather than a short-term project, fitting into a pattern of ongoing support required by advanced research institutions like AFRL.

Industry Classification

NAICS: Professional, Scientific, and Technical ServicesArchitectural, Engineering, and Related ServicesEngineering Services

Product/Service Code: SUPPORT SVCS (PROF, ADMIN, MGMT)PROFESSIONAL SERVICES

Competition & Pricing

Extent Competed: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION AFTER EXCLUSION OF SOURCES

Solicitation Procedures: NEGOTIATED PROPOSAL/QUOTE

Solicitation ID: 5TP57110011

Offers Received: 3

Pricing Type: FIRM FIXED PRICE (J)

Evaluated Preference: NONE

Contractor Details

Address: 14700 FLINT LEE RD UNIT C, CHANTILLY, VA, 20151

Business Categories: 8(a) Program Participant, Asian Pacific American Owned Business, Category Business, Corporate Entity Not Tax Exempt, DoT Certified Disadvantaged Business Enterprise, Minority Owned Business, Small Business, Small Disadvantaged Business, Special Designations, Subchapter S Corporation, U.S.-Owned Business

Financial Breakdown

Contract Ceiling: $62,510,252

Exercised Options: $56,413,419

Current Obligation: $35,612,945

Contract Characteristics

Commercial Item: SERVICES PURSUANT TO FAR 12.102(G)

Timeline

Start Date: 2012-04-04

Current End Date: 2018-06-17

Potential End Date: 2018-06-17 00:00:00

Last Modified: 2020-01-09

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