DoD's $26M Engineering Services Contract Awarded to Abbott on Call, Inc. with 2 Bidders
Contract Overview
Contract Amount: $26,073,209 ($26.1M)
Contractor: Abbott on Call, Inc.
Awarding Agency: Department of Defense
Start Date: 2015-08-21
End Date: 2025-02-20
Contract Duration: 3,471 days
Daily Burn Rate: $7.5K/day
Competition Type: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION
Number of Offers Received: 2
Pricing Type: COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE
Sector: Defense
Official Description: IGF::OT::IGF OPEN STRUCTURE ARCHITECTURE CONTRACT.
Place of Performance
Location: VIENNA, FAIRFAX County, VIRGINIA, 22182
State: Virginia Government Spending
Plain-Language Summary
Department of Defense obligated $26.1 million to ABBOTT ON CALL, INC. for work described as: IGF::OT::IGF OPEN STRUCTURE ARCHITECTURE CONTRACT. Key points: 1. The contract value of $26.07 million over its period of performance suggests a significant investment in engineering services. 2. With only two bidders, the competition level may have limited price discovery and potentially impacted overall value for money. 3. The Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) pricing structure introduces performance-based incentives but also carries inherent cost escalation risks. 4. The contract's duration of 3,471 days (approximately 9.5 years) indicates a long-term need for these engineering services. 5. The award to Abbott on Call, Inc. represents a substantial commitment to a single contractor for specialized engineering support. 6. The absence of small business set-aside flags suggests this contract was not specifically targeted to boost small business participation.
Value Assessment
Rating: fair
Benchmarking the value of this $26.07 million contract is challenging without specific service details and comparable market rates for specialized engineering services. The Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) structure, while incentivizing performance, can lead to higher costs than fixed-price contracts if not managed carefully. The limited competition (2 bidders) also raises questions about whether the government secured the most competitive pricing possible. Further analysis would require understanding the specific engineering tasks performed and comparing them to industry standards and other similar government contracts.
Cost Per Unit: N/A
Competition Analysis
Competition Level: full-and-open
This contract was awarded under full and open competition, indicating that all responsible sources were permitted to submit offers. However, only two bids were received. This limited number of bidders suggests that the market for these specific engineering services may be concentrated, or that other potential bidders chose not to participate for various reasons. While competition was technically open, the low number of offers could have constrained the government's ability to achieve the most favorable pricing through robust bidding.
Taxpayer Impact: With only two offers received, taxpayers may have missed out on potentially lower prices that could have resulted from a more competitive bidding environment. The limited competition could lead to higher overall costs for the services rendered.
Public Impact
The Department of the Navy benefits from specialized engineering services crucial for its operations and infrastructure. The contract supports the development and maintenance of critical defense systems and potentially naval facilities. The geographic impact is primarily within the United States, supporting Department of Defense activities. The contract likely supports a specialized engineering workforce, contributing to employment in the engineering sector.
Waste & Efficiency Indicators
Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10
Warning Flags
- Limited competition (2 bidders) may have resulted in suboptimal pricing for taxpayers.
- The Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract type carries inherent risks of cost overruns if not closely monitored.
- The long contract duration (approx. 9.5 years) increases exposure to potential scope creep and evolving requirements.
- Lack of small business set-aside may limit opportunities for smaller, specialized engineering firms.
Positive Signals
- Awarded under full and open competition, ensuring a broad initial solicitation.
- The CPIF structure incentivizes contractor performance, potentially leading to higher quality outcomes.
- The contract addresses a long-term need for engineering services, indicating strategic planning by the agency.
- The contractor, Abbott on Call, Inc., has secured a significant contract, suggesting a level of established capability.
Sector Analysis
This contract falls within the Engineering Services sector, a critical component of the broader professional, scientific, and technical services industry. This sector is characterized by specialized expertise and often supports large-scale government projects, particularly in defense and infrastructure. The market size for engineering services is substantial, with government contracts forming a significant portion. This specific contract likely supports niche engineering requirements within the Department of the Navy, potentially related to naval architecture, systems engineering, or specialized technical consulting.
Small Business Impact
The contract data indicates that this was not a small business set-aside. The absence of specific subcontracting requirements for small businesses in the provided data suggests that opportunities for small businesses may be limited unless the prime contractor voluntarily includes them. This could mean that the primary benefits of this contract accrue to larger firms, potentially impacting the broader small business ecosystem within the engineering services sector.
Oversight & Accountability
Oversight for this contract would typically be managed by the Department of the Navy's contracting and program management offices. Accountability measures are embedded within the Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) structure, which links contractor profit to performance metrics. Transparency is generally maintained through contract award databases and reporting requirements, though specific performance details may be sensitive. The Inspector General for the Department of Defense would have jurisdiction to investigate any potential fraud, waste, or abuse related to this contract.
Related Government Programs
- Naval Engineering Support Contracts
- Department of Defense Engineering Services
- Cost Plus Incentive Fee Contracts
- Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
Risk Flags
- Limited Competition
- Potential for Cost Overruns (CPIF)
- Long Contract Duration Risk
Tags
defense, department-of-the-navy, engineering-services, full-and-open-competition, cost-plus-incentive-fee, large-contract, long-term-contract, abbott-on-call-inc, virginia, professional-scientific-and-technical-services
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this federal contract paying for?
Department of Defense awarded $26.1 million to ABBOTT ON CALL, INC.. IGF::OT::IGF OPEN STRUCTURE ARCHITECTURE CONTRACT.
Who is the contractor on this award?
The obligated recipient is ABBOTT ON CALL, INC..
Which agency awarded this contract?
Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Department of the Navy).
What is the total obligated amount?
The obligated amount is $26.1 million.
What is the period of performance?
Start: 2015-08-21. End: 2025-02-20.
What is the track record of Abbott on Call, Inc. in performing similar large-scale engineering contracts for the Department of Defense?
Abbott on Call, Inc. has been awarded this significant $26.07 million contract for engineering services by the Department of the Navy, indicating a level of trust and capability recognized by the agency. While the provided data does not detail their full contract history, securing a multi-year, full-and-open competition award suggests they possess the necessary qualifications and experience. Further investigation into their past performance ratings, previous contract values, and the types of engineering services they have delivered for the DoD would provide a more comprehensive understanding of their track record. Analyzing their performance on prior CPIF contracts, if any, would also be valuable in assessing their ability to manage cost incentives effectively.
How does the awarded amount compare to similar engineering services contracts within the Department of the Navy?
The $26.07 million award for engineering services is a substantial sum, placing it in the mid-to-large tier for individual contract awards within the Department of the Navy. Without specific details on the nature of the engineering services, direct comparison is difficult. However, contracts for specialized engineering support, systems integration, or long-term technical consulting for naval platforms or infrastructure can range from several million to tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars over their lifecycle. The duration of this contract (approx. 9.5 years) suggests a significant, ongoing requirement, which is typical for major defense programs. Benchmarking against contracts with similar NAICS codes (541330 - Engineering Services) and contract types (CPIF) awarded by the Navy in recent years would provide a clearer picture of its relative value and scope.
What are the primary risks associated with the Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract type for this engineering service?
The primary risks associated with the Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract type for this engineering service revolve around cost control and potential for overruns. While CPIF aims to incentivize efficiency by sharing cost savings or overruns between the government and the contractor based on pre-defined targets, it inherently allows for costs to exceed initial estimates. The government bears a significant portion of the cost risk, as the contractor is reimbursed for allowable costs plus a fee that can be adjusted based on performance. Effective oversight is crucial to ensure that costs remain reasonable and that the incentive structure truly drives desired performance outcomes rather than simply inflating the final price. Scope creep, if not managed tightly, can exacerbate these risks.
What is the potential impact of having only two bidders on the price discovery and overall value for this contract?
Having only two bidders in a full and open competition significantly limits price discovery and can negatively impact the overall value for money. With a larger pool of bidders, competition typically drives down prices as companies vie for the contract. When only two entities submit offers, the government has less leverage to negotiate favorable terms, and the risk of collusion, while not implied here, is theoretically higher. The winning bidder may not have felt the pressure to offer their most competitive price, potentially leading to a higher cost for the taxpayer than if more companies had participated. This situation warrants scrutiny to ensure the selected price is indeed fair and reasonable.
How does the long contract duration (3,471 days) affect the management and oversight of this engineering services contract?
The long contract duration of 3,471 days (approximately 9.5 years) presents both opportunities and challenges for contract management and oversight. On the positive side, it allows for continuity of services and the development of deep expertise by the contractor, potentially leading to greater efficiency and effectiveness over time. However, it also increases the risk of scope creep, evolving technological requirements, and potential cost increases due to inflation or unforeseen issues. The Department of the Navy must implement robust oversight mechanisms, including regular performance reviews, change management processes, and vigilant cost tracking, to ensure the contract remains aligned with its objectives and provides value throughout its extended term. Proactive risk management is essential to mitigate the challenges posed by such a long commitment.
Industry Classification
NAICS: Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services › Architectural, Engineering, and Related Services › Engineering Services
Product/Service Code: SUPPORT SVCS (PROF, ADMIN, MGMT) › PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
Competition & Pricing
Extent Competed: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION
Solicitation Procedures: SUBJECT TO MULTIPLE AWARD FAIR OPPORTUNITY
Solicitation ID: N0002414R3241
Offers Received: 2
Pricing Type: COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE (V)
Evaluated Preference: NONE
Contractor Details
Address: 1367 CARPERS FARM WAY, VIENNA, VA, 22182
Business Categories: Category Business, Corporate Entity Not Tax Exempt, Small Business, Special Designations, Subchapter S Corporation, U.S.-Owned Business, Woman Owned Business, Women Owned Small Business
Financial Breakdown
Contract Ceiling: $43,260,885
Exercised Options: $43,260,885
Current Obligation: $26,073,209
Contract Characteristics
Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS/SERVICES PROCEDURES NOT USED
Cost or Pricing Data: NO
Parent Contract
Parent Award PIID: N0017814D7585
IDV Type: IDC
Timeline
Start Date: 2015-08-21
Current End Date: 2025-02-20
Potential End Date: 2025-02-20 00:00:00
Last Modified: 2025-10-15
Other Department of Defense Contracts
- Federal Contract — $51.3B (Humana Government Business Inc)
- Lrip LOT 12 Advance Acquisition Contract — $35.1B (Lockheed Martin Corporation)
- SSN 802 and 803 Long Lead Time Material — $34.7B (Electric Boat Corporation)
- 200204!008532!1700!AF600 !naval AIR Systems Command !N0001902C3002 !A!N! !N! !20011026!20120430!008016958!008016958!834951691!n!lockheed Martin Corporation !lockheed Blvd !fort Worth !tx!76108!27000!439!48!fort Worth !tarrant !texas !+000026000000!n!n!018981928201!ac15!rdte/Aircraft-Eng/Manuf Develop !a1a!airframes and Spares !2ama!jast/Jsf !336411!E! !3! ! ! ! ! !99990909!B! ! !A! !a!n!r!2!002!n!1a!a!n!z! ! !N!C!N! ! ! !a!a!a!a!000!a!c!n! ! ! !Y! !N00019!0001! — $34.2B (Lockheed Martin Corporation)
- KC-X Modernization Program — $32.0B (THE Boeing Company)