DoD's $128.7M B-2 PDM contract awarded to Northrop Grumman, highlighting sole-source reliance for critical aircraft maintenance

Contract Overview

Contract Amount: $128,658,534 ($128.7M)

Contractor: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp

Awarding Agency: Department of Defense

Start Date: 2019-01-01

End Date: 2020-10-31

Contract Duration: 669 days

Daily Burn Rate: $192.3K/day

Competition Type: NOT COMPETED

Pricing Type: FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE

Sector: Defense

Official Description: CY19 B-2 PROGRAMMED DEPOT MAINTENANCE (PDM)

Place of Performance

Location: PALMDALE, LOS ANGELES County, CALIFORNIA, 93550

State: California Government Spending

Plain-Language Summary

Department of Defense obligated $128.7 million to NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORP for work described as: CY19 B-2 PROGRAMMED DEPOT MAINTENANCE (PDM) Key points: 1. Sole-source award suggests limited market alternatives for specialized B-2 bomber maintenance. 2. Fixed-price incentive contract structure aims to balance cost control with performance incentives. 3. Contract duration of 669 days indicates a significant, long-term maintenance requirement. 4. The contract's value represents a substantial investment in maintaining the B-2 fleet's readiness. 5. Focus on programmed depot maintenance underscores the importance of sustainment for aging aircraft. 6. Lack of competition may limit opportunities for cost savings through market pressure.

Value Assessment

Rating: fair

Benchmarking the value of this contract is challenging due to its sole-source nature and specialized scope. The fixed-price incentive (FPI) structure suggests an attempt to manage costs, but without competitive bids, it's difficult to ascertain if the pricing reflects true market value. The contract's value of approximately $128.7 million for programmed depot maintenance over 22 months indicates a significant expenditure for sustaining the B-2 fleet. Further analysis would require access to cost breakdowns and historical maintenance costs for similar aircraft.

Cost Per Unit: N/A

Competition Analysis

Competition Level: sole-source

This contract was awarded on a sole-source basis, meaning only one contractor, Northrop Grumman Systems Corp, was considered. This typically occurs when a contract is for a unique product or service for which only one responsible source is capable of providing the required supplies or services. The lack of competition means that the government did not benefit from a bidding process, which could have potentially led to lower prices or more innovative solutions from multiple vendors.

Taxpayer Impact: Sole-source awards can result in higher costs for taxpayers as there is no competitive pressure to drive down prices. It also limits the government's ability to explore alternative solutions or leverage a broader industrial base.

Public Impact

The primary beneficiaries are the U.S. Air Force and the Department of Defense, ensuring the operational readiness of the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber fleet. Services delivered include programmed depot maintenance, crucial for extending the lifespan and maintaining the combat effectiveness of these advanced aircraft. The geographic impact is primarily centered around the facilities where the B-2 bombers are based and maintained, likely within the continental United States. Workforce implications include the employment of highly skilled technicians, engineers, and support staff at Northrop Grumman, specializing in complex aerospace systems.

Waste & Efficiency Indicators

Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10

Warning Flags

  • Sole-source award limits price discovery and potential cost savings.
  • Reliance on a single contractor for critical maintenance could pose supply chain or technical risks if that contractor faces issues.
  • Fixed-price incentive contracts can sometimes lead to cost overruns if not managed carefully, despite the incentive structure.

Positive Signals

  • Award to an incumbent, experienced contractor (Northrop Grumman) likely ensures continuity and expertise in maintaining the highly specialized B-2 aircraft.
  • The fixed-price incentive structure, if executed well, can align contractor and government interests towards efficient performance and cost control.
  • Programmed depot maintenance ensures the long-term viability and readiness of a critical strategic asset.

Sector Analysis

The aerospace and defense sector is characterized by high barriers to entry, complex technological requirements, and significant government investment. Contracts for specialized maintenance of advanced platforms like the B-2 bomber are typically awarded to original equipment manufacturers or highly specialized MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) providers. The market for such niche services is often limited, leading to sole-source or limited competition awards. Spending in this area is critical for national security and maintaining the operational readiness of the U.S. military's strategic assets.

Small Business Impact

This contract does not appear to have a small business set-aside component, as indicated by 'sb': false. Given the specialized nature of B-2 bomber maintenance, it is unlikely that small businesses would be primary contractors for such a complex undertaking. However, Northrop Grumman, as the prime contractor, may engage small businesses as subcontractors for specific components or services, contributing to the broader small business ecosystem within the defense supply chain.

Oversight & Accountability

Oversight for this contract would primarily fall under the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force. Given it's a sole-source award for critical aircraft maintenance, robust oversight mechanisms are expected, including contract performance monitoring, quality assurance checks, and financial audits. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides the framework for contract management. While specific Inspector General (IG) involvement isn't detailed here, the DoD IG typically has jurisdiction over defense contracts to investigate fraud, waste, and abuse.

Related Government Programs

  • B-2 Bomber Sustainment Programs
  • Air Force Aircraft Maintenance Contracts
  • Defense Depot Maintenance Services
  • Northrop Grumman Defense Contracts
  • Fixed-Price Incentive Contracts in Defense

Risk Flags

  • Sole-source award
  • Lack of competition
  • Critical asset maintenance dependency

Tags

defense, department-of-defense, department-of-the-air-force, northrop-grumman-systems-corp, b-2-bomber, programmed-depot-maintenance, sole-source, fixed-price-incentive, aircraft-manufacturing, california, cy19, delivery-order

Frequently Asked Questions

What is this federal contract paying for?

Department of Defense awarded $128.7 million to NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORP. CY19 B-2 PROGRAMMED DEPOT MAINTENANCE (PDM)

Who is the contractor on this award?

The obligated recipient is NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORP.

Which agency awarded this contract?

Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Department of the Air Force).

What is the total obligated amount?

The obligated amount is $128.7 million.

What is the period of performance?

Start: 2019-01-01. End: 2020-10-31.

What is Northrop Grumman's track record with B-2 program maintenance?

Northrop Grumman Systems Corp, as the original manufacturer of the B-2 Spirit, has an extensive and established track record in maintaining and supporting the aircraft. Their involvement spans the entire lifecycle of the B-2 program, from development and production to sustainment. This includes previous programmed depot maintenance cycles and ongoing support services. Their deep institutional knowledge and specialized facilities are critical for ensuring the continued operational readiness of the B-2 fleet. The company's long-standing relationship with the Air Force for this platform suggests a high degree of trust and proven capability in handling the complex maintenance requirements.

How does the pricing of this contract compare to similar aircraft maintenance contracts?

Direct comparison of pricing for this specific B-2 PDM contract is difficult due to its sole-source nature and the unique technological requirements of the B-2 bomber. However, programmed depot maintenance for high-value, complex military aircraft is inherently expensive. Costs are driven by specialized labor, unique parts, extensive testing, and the need for secure, advanced facilities. While the $128.7 million figure over approximately 22 months represents a substantial investment, it must be evaluated within the context of the B-2's strategic importance and the limited number of platforms requiring such intensive sustainment. Without competitive bids or data on similar sole-source PDM contracts for comparable aircraft, a definitive value-for-money assessment is challenging.

What are the primary risks associated with this sole-source contract?

The primary risk associated with this sole-source contract is the lack of competitive pressure, which can lead to higher costs for the government and taxpayers than might be achieved in a competitive environment. There is also a risk of contractor complacency or reduced incentive to innovate on cost-saving measures. Furthermore, reliance on a single provider for critical maintenance creates a dependency; any disruption to Northrop Grumman's operations, such as labor disputes, supply chain issues, or financial difficulties, could directly impact the availability and readiness of the B-2 fleet. The government's negotiating leverage is also diminished in a sole-source scenario.

How effective is the fixed-price incentive (FPI) contract type in managing costs for this program?

The Fixed-Price Incentive (FPI) contract type aims to provide a middle ground between fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts, offering cost control incentives. In an FPI contract, the final price is adjusted based on the contractor's performance against target cost and target profit objectives. If the contractor achieves lower costs than targeted, both the contractor and the government share in the savings (under a ceiling price). Conversely, if costs exceed the target, the contractor bears a larger share of the overrun up to the ceiling. For this B-2 PDM contract, the FPI structure incentivizes Northrop Grumman to manage costs efficiently while performing the required maintenance. Its effectiveness hinges on realistic target setting and diligent government oversight to ensure the contractor is motivated to achieve cost savings.

What is the historical spending trend for B-2 programmed depot maintenance?

Historical spending data for B-2 programmed depot maintenance (PDM) would reveal trends in sustainment costs over time. While this specific contract covers CY19 PDM, understanding previous PDM awards for the B-2 would provide context on cost escalation, frequency of maintenance, and potential changes in scope or efficiency. Without access to historical contract awards for B-2 PDM, it's difficult to establish a precise trend. However, it is generally expected that maintenance costs for aging aircraft fleets tend to increase due to parts obsolescence, increased repair complexity, and the need for more extensive overhauls. Analyzing past spending would help determine if current costs are in line with historical patterns or represent a significant deviation.

What are the implications of the contract duration (669 days) on program management?

A contract duration of 669 days (approximately 22 months) for programmed depot maintenance indicates a substantial and complex undertaking. This extended timeline allows for thorough execution of all required maintenance tasks, inspections, repairs, and upgrades necessary to ensure the B-2 fleet's long-term operational readiness. From a program management perspective, this duration necessitates robust planning, scheduling, and resource allocation over an extended period. It also implies a significant commitment of government funding and contractor resources. The extended period allows for a more methodical approach to maintenance, potentially reducing rushed work and improving quality, but also requires sustained oversight and management to ensure milestones are met and costs remain controlled.

Industry Classification

NAICS: ManufacturingAerospace Product and Parts ManufacturingAircraft Manufacturing

Product/Service Code: SUPPORT SVCS (PROF, ADMIN, MGMT)PROFESSIONAL SERVICES

Competition & Pricing

Extent Competed: NOT COMPETED

Solicitation Procedures: ONLY ONE SOURCE

Pricing Type: FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE (L)

Evaluated Preference: NONE

Contractor Details

Parent Company: Northrop Grumman Corporation

Address: 3520 E AVE M, PALMDALE, CA, 93550

Business Categories: Category Business, Corporate Entity Not Tax Exempt, Not Designated a Small Business, Special Designations, U.S.-Owned Business

Financial Breakdown

Contract Ceiling: $168,598,246

Exercised Options: $168,598,246

Current Obligation: $128,658,534

Actual Outlays: $393,899

Subaward Activity

Number of Subawards: 96

Total Subaward Amount: $23,887,255

Contract Characteristics

Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS/SERVICES PROCEDURES NOT USED

Cost or Pricing Data: YES

Parent Contract

Parent Award PIID: FA861614D6060

IDV Type: IDC

Timeline

Start Date: 2019-01-01

Current End Date: 2020-10-31

Potential End Date: 2020-10-31 00:00:00

Last Modified: 2025-08-26

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