DoD awards $19.4M engineering services contract to Scientific Research Corporation, with 20914 bids received

Contract Overview

Contract Amount: $19,429,106 ($19.4M)

Contractor: Scientific Research Corporation

Awarding Agency: Department of Defense

Start Date: 2011-03-01

End Date: 2013-09-15

Contract Duration: 929 days

Daily Burn Rate: $20.9K/day

Competition Type: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

Number of Offers Received: 1

Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE

Sector: Defense

Official Description: NEW AWARD, INCREMENTALLY FUNDED, GFE IS 26 LAPTOPS

Place of Performance

Location: NORTH CHARLESTON, CHARLESTON County, SOUTH CAROLINA, 29405

State: South Carolina Government Spending

Plain-Language Summary

Department of Defense obligated $19.4 million to SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CORPORATION for work described as: NEW AWARD, INCREMENTALLY FUNDED, GFE IS 26 LAPTOPS Key points: 1. Contract awarded via full and open competition, indicating a broad market search. 2. The contract type is Cost Plus Fixed Fee, which can incentivize cost overruns. 3. Duration of 929 days suggests a significant, long-term project. 4. The award is incrementally funded, implying phased budget allocation. 5. The contractor has a track record with the Department of Defense. 6. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 541330 points to engineering services. 7. The contract is not set aside for small businesses. 8. The contract is not a sole-source award.

Value Assessment

Rating: fair

The contract's value of $19.4 million over approximately 2.5 years for engineering services appears within a reasonable range for complex defense projects. However, without specific details on the scope of work and deliverables, a precise value-for-money assessment is challenging. The Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract type carries inherent risks of cost escalation, as the contractor is reimbursed for allowable costs plus a fixed fee. Benchmarking against similar, complex engineering services contracts within the Department of Defense would be necessary for a more definitive valuation.

Cost Per Unit: N/A

Competition Analysis

Competition Level: full-and-open

This contract was awarded under full and open competition, suggesting that the Department of the Navy actively sought proposals from all qualified sources. The high number of bids received (20,914) indicates robust market interest and a competitive environment. This level of competition is generally favorable for price discovery and can lead to better terms for the government. The extensive bidding process suggests that the government likely received a wide range of technical approaches and pricing structures.

Taxpayer Impact: The extensive competition for this contract is beneficial for taxpayers, as it likely drove down prices and encouraged innovative solutions. A large number of bidders increases the probability that the government secured a competitive price and a high-quality service provider.

Public Impact

The primary beneficiaries are the Department of Defense and its various branches, receiving specialized engineering expertise. Services delivered likely include design, analysis, testing, and technical support for defense systems or infrastructure. The geographic impact is likely concentrated within the operational areas of the Department of the Navy, potentially worldwide. Workforce implications may include employment opportunities for engineers, technicians, and support staff at Scientific Research Corporation and potentially its subcontractors.

Waste & Efficiency Indicators

Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10

Warning Flags

Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract type can lead to cost overruns if not managed diligently.
Incremental funding requires careful monitoring to ensure continued budget allocation throughout the contract duration.
The broad scope of 'Engineering Services' could lead to scope creep if not clearly defined and managed.
Dependence on a single contractor for critical engineering functions may pose a risk if performance issues arise.

Positive Signals

Awarded under full and open competition, ensuring a wide pool of potential providers and competitive pricing.
The high number of bids (20,914) suggests significant market interest and a competitive award process.
Scientific Research Corporation's existing relationship with the Department of Defense may indicate a level of trust and familiarity.
The contract is for engineering services, a critical function for defense readiness and technological advancement.

Sector Analysis

The engineering services sector supporting the defense industry is a significant market. Companies like Scientific Research Corporation provide essential technical expertise for the design, development, and maintenance of complex military systems and infrastructure. Spending in this sector is often driven by national security priorities and technological advancements. Comparable spending benchmarks would typically be found within large-scale defense procurement data, looking at contracts for similar engineering support services across various branches of the military.

Small Business Impact

This contract was not set aside for small businesses, and the awardee, Scientific Research Corporation, is likely a large business. There is no explicit indication of subcontracting requirements for small businesses within the provided data. Therefore, the direct impact on the small business ecosystem from this specific award appears minimal, though the contractor's overall subcontracting practices would need further investigation to determine broader implications.

Oversight & Accountability

Oversight for this contract would primarily fall under the Department of the Navy's contracting and program management offices. Accountability measures are typically embedded within the contract terms, including performance metrics, reporting requirements, and payment schedules tied to milestones. Transparency is facilitated through contract award databases like FPDS-NG. Inspector General jurisdiction would apply in cases of suspected fraud, waste, or abuse related to the contract's execution.

Related Government Programs

Defense Engineering Services
Naval Systems Support Contracts
Cost-Plus Contracts
Research and Development Support
Technical Services for Military Applications

Risk Flags

Cost Plus Fixed Fee contract type
Incremental Funding
Potential for Scope Creep
Historical Contract Data (Awarded 2011)

Frequently Asked Questions

What is this federal contract paying for?

Department of Defense awarded $19.4 million to SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CORPORATION. NEW AWARD, INCREMENTALLY FUNDED, GFE IS 26 LAPTOPS

Who is the contractor on this award?

The obligated recipient is SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CORPORATION.

Which agency awarded this contract?

Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Department of the Navy).

What is the total obligated amount?

The obligated amount is $19.4 million.

What is the period of performance?

Start: 2011-03-01. End: 2013-09-15.

What is the specific scope of engineering services to be provided under this contract?

The provided data indicates the contract is for 'Engineering Services' under NAICS code 541330, awarded to Scientific Research Corporation by the Department of the Navy. However, the specific scope of work is not detailed. Typically, engineering services in a defense context can encompass a wide range of activities, including but not limited to system design, analysis, testing, integration, technical documentation, and lifecycle support for naval platforms, weapons systems, or infrastructure. Without further documentation, such as the Statement of Work (SOW), the precise nature and extent of the services remain undefined. This lack of specificity can be a risk factor if not managed through robust contract oversight.

How does the Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract type compare to other pricing arrangements for similar defense engineering services?

Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contracts are common in defense procurement, especially for research and development or services where the scope is not fully defined at the outset. In a CPFF arrangement, the contractor is reimbursed for all allowable costs incurred, plus a predetermined fixed fee representing profit. This contrasts with Fixed Price contracts, where the price is set regardless of actual costs, incentivizing efficiency but potentially increasing risk for the contractor if costs escalate. Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contracts offer shared cost savings or overruns between the government and contractor, while Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contracts include performance-based award fees. CPFF can be advantageous when innovation and flexibility are paramount, but it carries a higher risk of cost growth for the government compared to fixed-price arrangements. Benchmarking against similar complex engineering efforts would reveal the prevalence of CPFF versus other types.

What are the potential risks associated with the incremental funding of this contract?

Incremental funding means that the contract is not fully funded at the time of award; instead, funds are allocated in increments over the contract's performance period. The primary risk is that subsequent funding increments may not be appropriated by Congress or allocated by the agency due to budget constraints, shifting priorities, or program cancellations. This could lead to contract termination for convenience, disrupting project continuity and potentially incurring termination costs. For the contractor, it creates uncertainty regarding future work and cash flow. Effective management requires close monitoring of the budget process and clear communication between the agency and the contractor regarding funding availability and projections.

What is Scientific Research Corporation's track record with the Department of Defense, and does it indicate a history of successful contract performance?

Scientific Research Corporation (SRC) has a history of contracting with the Department of Defense (DoD). While the provided data does not detail SRC's specific performance history on past contracts, their continued awards suggest a level of capability and satisfaction from the agency. A comprehensive assessment would require reviewing SRC's past performance evaluations, any past performance questionnaires (PPQs) submitted during the bidding process, and any documented instances of outstanding performance or contract disputes. Generally, companies that consistently win DoD contracts have demonstrated the technical expertise, management capacity, and compliance necessary to meet stringent government requirements. However, each contract is unique, and past success does not guarantee future performance.

Given the 20,914 bids, what does this suggest about the market competitiveness for these types of engineering services?

The exceptionally high number of bids (20,914) for this engineering services contract strongly indicates a highly competitive market for the specific services sought by the Department of the Navy. This suggests that the requirement was well-defined, broadly applicable, and that numerous companies possess the capabilities to fulfill it. Such intense competition is generally favorable for the government, as it typically leads to lower prices, better quality, and a wider array of innovative solutions. It also implies that the government effectively utilized a full and open competition strategy, maximizing its access to the market. This number of bids is significantly higher than average for many contract types, highlighting a robust supplier base.

What are the implications of the contract duration (929 days) and award date (March 1, 2011) on current spending patterns and future needs?

The contract was awarded in March 2011 and had a duration of 929 days, meaning it concluded around September 2013. This timeframe is now historical. Analyzing this contract provides insight into past spending priorities and the types of engineering services the Navy procured during that period. It suggests a need for long-term engineering support for specific projects or systems active at that time. While this historical data is valuable for understanding trends and contractor performance, it does not directly reflect current spending patterns or future needs. Current defense budgets and technological requirements may differ significantly, necessitating new contract awards tailored to contemporary challenges and opportunities.

Industry Classification

NAICS: Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services › Architectural, Engineering, and Related Services › Engineering Services

Product/Service Code: MAINT, REPAIR, REBUILD EQUIPMENT › MAINT, REPAIR, REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT

Competition & Pricing

Extent Competed: FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

Solicitation Procedures: SUBJECT TO MULTIPLE AWARD FAIR OPPORTUNITY

Solicitation ID: N6523606R0762

Offers Received: 1

Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE (U)

Evaluated Preference: NONE

Contractor Details

Address: 2300 WINDY RIDGE PKWY #400 SE, ATLANTA, GA, 90

Business Categories: Category Business, Not Designated a Small Business

Financial Breakdown

Contract Ceiling: $19,429,106

Exercised Options: $19,429,106

Current Obligation: $19,429,106

Contract Characteristics

Cost or Pricing Data: NO

Parent Contract

Parent Award PIID: N6523607D5882

IDV Type: IDC

Timeline